The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power by Plater, Zygmunt J.B.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
1-1-1974
The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines
and the Police Power
Zygmunt J.B. Plater
Boston College Law School, plater@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Land Use Planning
Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zygmunt J.B. Plater. "The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power." Texas Law Review 52, (1974): 201-256.
Texas Law Review 
Volume 52, Number 2, January 1974 
The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: 
Floodlines and the Police Power 
Zygmunt J. B. Plater* 
A flood disaster is not an act of God: it is an act of war. The 
United States is currently entangled in an undeclared domestic war, 
fighting an enemy that could have been an ally if we had recognized 
the foe's true nature in time, and supporting a regime that is incon-
sistent with basic national goals and destructive of the very things that 
the nation seeks to protect. Victory is impossible, for the cost of win-
ning exceeds the cost of losing. The war takes place on the nation's 
floodplains;l rivers are the enemy; and support for human confronta-
tion with rivers is our current questionable national policy. Like 
other wars, this one presents constitutional questions that reflect some 
of the deepest problems in our society and its legal system. Private 
property rights, which built the world's largest market economy, now 
impel the development of remaining unexploited areas. On the flood-
plains this pressure for investment and development results in escalat-
ing flood levels and a mounting destructive potential, despite the public 
works lobbies' crude and expensive efforts at flood control. Yet the 
entrenchment of private property interests in America makes it exceed-
ingly difficult to implement a regulatory policy aimed at cutting off the 
causes of disasters at their source. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tennessee; A.B., Princeton, 1965; J.D., 
Yale, 1968; LL.M., Michigan, 1973. This article was prepared during the course of an 
academic appointment to the University of Michigan Law School's Legislative Research 
Center, 1971-73, and I gratefuIIy acknowledge the support and guidance of Professors 
Joseph L. Sax, WiIIiam Pierce, and Peter W. Schroth, and of Robert Abrams. 
1. Floodplains are the areas adjacent to rivers periodicaIly required to hold or 
carry flood flows. For hydrological background see V. CHOW, HANDBOOK OF APPUED 
HYDROLOGY (1964); W. HoYT & W. LANGBEIN, FLOODS (1955); C. WISLER & E. BRA-
TER, HYDROLOGY (2d ed. 1959). 
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Current governmental flood control policy is pitifully shortsighted, 
unrealistically attempting to conquer rivers, actively encouraging pri-
vate gambles against them, absorbing large losses, and restoring the 
fallen combatants for future. encounters after each destructive battle. 
Rarely does anyone question the necessity for the conflict; even less 
frequently does anyone suggest that the contending forces should ac-
count for the disastrous consequences of their actions. The blame 
is ·thrown on God, whose acts are by definition unpredictable and in-
exorable. But floods are natural and predictable,2 and most flood 
disasters could be avoided if humans were not iocated in the path of 
floods. 
The confusion in contemporary constitutional takings tests has 
seriously undennined the effectiveness of floodplain land use regula-
tions, which offer the most practical possibilities for ending tile flood-
plain war, and in this regard the constitutional conflict on the flood-
plain reflects other environmental battles over wetlands, wilderness, 
.strip mining, and pollution. 3 Focusing primarily on private interests, 
current takings tests ignore the public costs that regulations seek to 
prevent. The courts' preoccupation with individual loss apparently de-
rives from the venerable words of Justice Holmes and from the current 
dominance of the takings -area by zoning cases. Applying zoning prin-
ciples, which in the zoning context typically support regulations far 
beyond strict protection against public injury, courts have been able 
to ignore public safety factors when they review nonzoning safety regu-
lations like floodplain controls.4 The deficiencies of this approach have 
2. Though specific flood dates are not predictable, general frequency over time 
is. Recognition of this fact is analogous to recent legislative recognition of ecological 
principles in other areas of the law. It is difficult to hold riparians legally accountable 
for flood hazards. Some argue that rivers could be made accountable for their depre-
dations. See Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?: Toward Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450, 481 (1972). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
3. Floodplain land use regulations typically appear in "floodplain zone" ordi-
nances, but they also occur in subdivision ordinances, in wetland regulations, and stand-
ing alone. Besides raising many of the same constitutional questions as other environ-
mental regulatory areas, floodplains are often the most scenic parts of the local land-
scape, and they are therefore 'prime targets for environmental quality concern. See 
W. WHYTE, THE LAsT LANDsCAPE 44 (1968). 
4. Viewed from one perspective, zoning cases are the most liberal extension of 
regulatory power, since they are now sustained on the basis of general planning objec-
tives instead of public nuisance analogies. Compare Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926), with St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry., 413 
F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969). Furthermore, the zoning 
cases regularly assert the constitutional fairness of major private losses as long as a 
profitable residuum remains. Unfortunately, a takings test that is quite liberal in the 
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produced ,anomalies in environmental cases, uncertainty in the courts, 
and consternation 'among governmental officials who are handi-
capped in their regulatory efforts. IS Review of the available alterna-
tive takings tests, however, reveals many deficiencies despite their oc-
casional advantages over today's diminution test. The diminution 
theory potentially affords the most satisfactory test available, once it is 
clarified to incorporate explicit consideration of all affected interests in 
the regulatory situation. Weighing private losses against ,public rights 
reduces the scope of judicial arbitrariness and eliminates much of the 
subjectivity normally incorporated into the traditional diminution test, 
while increasing the likelihood that regulatory consequences will be in 
harmony with fairness e~pectations. 
I. Policy Decisions 
A. Resource Confrontation: Rivers, Humans, and Law 
Flood levels are perfectly natural occurrences in the life of a river. 
When circumstances combine to load a :civer with large volumes of 
water, it responds according to the laws of physics, expanding to take 
all space necessary to carry its burden. Since watersheds have dif-
fering contours, rainfall patterns, soil permeability, and human inter-
ference, every river is unique. But in the course of time every natural 
river system inevitably produces floods. 6 In its natural state the flood-
plain acts as the river's self-regulator, responding like a farflung reser-
voir to retard and hold waters until downstream levels subside suf-
ficiently to receive them. Even in the flood current area,7 where the 
typical zoning case can be extremely restrictive where no profitable property use re-
mains yet grave public harms, as opposed to the conjectural public welfare interests 
of zoning cases, are directly involved. 
5. Fear of being overturned in court or forced to pay compensation may easily 
deter legislators from enacting adequate controls. Ai; examples of the anomalies in 
the area, compare Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & 
Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970), with State v. Johnson, 
265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970). See also Bydlon v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. 
Cl. 1959) (regulatory restrictions, not physical invasion of private property rights by 
the government, made subject to inverse condemnation). 
6. Rainfall is the prime determinant of floods. Whenever soil is unable to absorb 
rainfall because of saturation, natural impermeability, and human modifications like as-
phalting, runoff occurs. In large amounts and in the right topographical context this 
produces floods. 
7. The flood ,current area or ''fIoodway'' is the portion of the river and floodplain 
area that conveys moving water, as distinguished from the static holding areas of the 
"floodfringe." Many resource policymakers have restricted their attention to this area 
of the floodplain. 
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water force is greatest, floods usually do not destroy the floodplain 
environment. Nature mitigates potential damages by discouraging frag-
ile and intolerant floodplain development, and the environmental dis-
ruptions that do occur heal naturally and quickly. The disasters oc-
cur when humans, refusing to follow nature's example, push out onto 
the river's territory and risk destruction to themselves and others. 
Human settlement on floodplains does not occur for lack of ca-
pacity to identify the danger. By correlating various data from water-
shed areas,8 hydrologists can compute the probable frequency of future 
flood levels with surprising accuracy.9 Even where floodplains are not 
immediately discernible to the eye, they can be accurately defined, 
mapped, and avoided. The technical ability to delineate floods, how-
ever, has not prevented man from challenging rivers in head-on con-
frontation by developing floodplains. Approximately five percent of 
the United States population now lives on floodplains, and the amount 
of that development continually increases.10 The final result is that 
floods, when they inevitably strike, take rising tolls in lives and prop-
erty. 
Ironically, the flood hazard is increasing not only because of the 
mere presence of increased investment and occupancy on the flood-
plain, but also because human interference with natural conditions over 
8. Relevant data include alluvial soil deposits, historical flood, weather and 
stream flow records, remote sensing, and vegetation studies. There is no single ac-
cepted method for computing flood frequencies; several government agencies rely upon 
historical data extrapolations or the log Pierson IT! method. The most modem tech-
nique appears to be the unit hydrograph method. See E. BRATER & J. SHERILL, PREDIC-
TION OF THE MAGNITUDE AND FREQUENCIES OF FLOODS IN MICIDGAN (1961); V. CHOW, 
supra note 1; U.S. WATER REsOURCES COUNCIL, UNIFORM TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMIN-
ING FLOOD FLow FREQUENCIES (1967). 
9. A 100-year flood, for example, is a flood level resulting from a combination 
of circumstances that can be expected to reach a given site elevation once in 100 years; 
every year there is a one-percent chance that a flood of that level will occur. Engi-
neers, however, refuse to predict flood levels for any given year. Three 100-year floods 
might hit within a month; the 250-year flood could occur any day. See Solomon v. 
Whitemarsh Township, 92 Montg. Co. 114 (Pa. C.P. 1969) (50-year flood occurred 
seven times in two years). These examples might also indicate that the frequencies 
are underestimated. Computed heights and frequencies can be laid out on topographi-
cal maps, delineating the areas that face probable flooding and noting the odds of its 
occurring each year. These maps form the basis of most modem floodplain regula-
tions, and they generally show the 100-year flood, in addition to higher or lower risk 
floods. 
10. Reliable statistics on floodplain development are nonexistent, but in light of 
consistent post£1ood reconstruction and new floodplain development the proposition 
is self-evident. See generally F. MuRPHY, REGULATING FLOOD-PLAIN DEVELOPMENT 
(1958); White, Strategic Aspects of Urban Flood Plain Occupance, in AMERICAN SOC'y 
CIVIL ENG'RS, 126 TRANSACTIONS pt. 1, at 63 (1961). 
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the years causes flood levels to rise. Human encroachment on the 
floodplain's carrying capacity and modification of runoff characteris-
tics have increased the percentage chance that a given flood elevation 
will be reached or exceeded each yearY By far the most common 
and significant encroachment is the inexpensive dumped or diked fill 
operation that raises property up from the floodplain. Those en-
croachments fairly effectively diminish dangers to the buildings on 
them, but they have very serious consequences elsewhere in the re-
source network. Encroachments anywhere in the floodplain dis-
place the floodplain's natural storage capacity; the degree of displace-
ment depends upon the nature of the encroachment. 
At first glance the effect may seem minimal; the total storage 
loss from an individual encroachment in the 100-year flood may amount 
to less than a hundred cubic yards of water. Measured against the value 
of an individual investment, the potential harm due to this floodflow 
increment may be small, and it may be infinitesimal compared to total 
downstream flood stages. Moreover, until recently hydrologists ap-
parently doubted the importance of floodplain storage, assuming that 
the floodway currents were the only significant floodflow element. 
For these reasons some legal observers concluded that the encroach-
ment-displacement effect was an insufficient justification for regulations 
excluding development from the floodplain. Using the same assump-
tions, several courts and legislatures have implied the same conclu-
sion.12 While individual encroachments may have minimal local 
11. See G. WHITE, CHOICE OF ADJUSTMENT TO FLOODS (1964). The common 
sense correlation of damages with increased floodplain development is documented in 
TASK: FORCE ON FEDERAL FLOOD CoNTROL POLICY, A UNIFIED NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR 
MANAGING FLOOD LOSSES, H.R. Doc. No. 465, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as TASK: FORCE REpORT]. The planners' slow realization that these dam-
ages would not occur if development were directed elsewhere is reflected in TENNESSEE 
VALLEY AUTIIORlTY, FLOOD DAMAGE PREVENTION: AN INDEXED BmLIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 
1973). The cause of increased flood levels does not appear to be increased rainfall, 
since records do not show a noticeable increase in precipitation over the years. Human 
modification of watersheds has increased the volume, height, and velocity of runoff lev-
els by covering the soil and groundwater aquifer recharge areas, channelizing water-
courses, and encroaching on the floodplain's carrying capacity. Interview with Prof. 
E.F. Brater, Dep't of Civil Eng'r, University of Michigan, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
April 7, 1972. See C. WISLER & E. BRATER, supra note 1, at 77-79. 
12. Baker v. Planning Bd., 353 Mass. 141, 228 N.E.2d 831 (1967); Morris County 
Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 
232 (1963). Hager v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 261 
S.W.2d 619 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953), is often cited for this proposition though it involved 
backwater flooding from a government dam, not natural flood storage. MICH. COMP. 
LAws ANN. § 323.2a, as amended, (Supp. 1973-74), restricts controls to the floodway. 
See also .AMERICAN Soc'y C!vJL ENG'RS TASK: FORCE ON FLOODPLAIN REGULATION, A 
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displacement effects, however, their cumulative consequences through-
out a watershed seriously increase the frequency of floods and aggravate 
downstream damages. In a recent engineering study at the Univer-
sity of Michigan the cumulative e:fifect of encroachments throughout 
a computer-simulated watershed showed flood increases of 30 per-
cent. 13 The computerized watershed, of course, was less responsive 
than some natural watersheds and more responsive than others, and in 
river systems without numerous encroachments the 30 percent figure 
will be of limited usefulness. Nonetheless, the study for the first time 
established scientific support for the common sense principle that ex-
tensive encroachment upon floodplain storage areas will result in signif-
icant increases in flood flows and flood hazards.14 
The probability that a flood will reach a given elevation in a 
particular year thus increases with additional floodplain development. 
Parcels that were threatened only by 250-year floods a generation ago 
may now fall within the lOO-year floodIines. Since today's marginal 
location may be in the path of the next major flood, these rising levels 
emphasize the urgency of preventing all unnecessary human develop-
ment in the floodplain. As a constitutional matter, this aspect of flood 
causation is important for the defense of regulatory measures ~at 
attempt to keep people off the floodplains. Regulating potential flood 
victims may not seem so harsh if they are viewed as contributing 
causes as well as potential victims of future floods. 
The fact that encroachment results in diminished danger to the 
encroacher does not entirely explain why people live and build on the 
floodplain. Obvious risks stili remain for all floodplain development. 
The annual recurrence of flood disasters should sufficiently demonstrate 
that anyone living or ibuilding near a river faces potential destruction; 
thus plain ignorance does not explain this behavior.15 The scene, re-
GUIDE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF FLooDPLAIN REGULATION 24 (1969), asserting that out-
of-flow ponding areas have insignificant effects. This is also the shortcoming of stat-
utes that focus upon channel encroachments. See Beuchert, State Regulation of Chan-
nel Encroachments, 4 NATURAL REsOURCES J. 486 (1965). 
13. S. Sangal, The Surface Runoff Process During Intense Storms, 1970 (unpub-
lished thesis, Dept. of Civil Eng'r, Univ. of Michigan). 
14. Connecticut is apparently the only state that recognizes this prin,ciple in its leg-
islation. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4(a), as amended, (Supp. 1973) (requiring re-
view of cumulative encroachment effect). The Massachusetts courts have recently ac-
cepted the principle. Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, - Mass. -, 284 N.E. 
2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973). See also U.S • .ARMY CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS (NEW ENGLAND DIV.), CHARLES RIVER STuDY, App. D (1972). 
15. Contemporary humans are apparently more ignorant than the American Indians 
and early farming settlers who rarely established perolaDent settlements on floodplains 
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peated after virtually every :recent flood, of citizens rebuilding their 
wrecked floodplain homes l'recisely where they stood before demon-
strates that even with clear information men and their market will 
choose to risk flood dangers.16 In some places unfortunate physical 
constraints encourage -floodplain development. In steep valley areas or 
broad flatlands like the Mississippi basin, for example, developers may 
have no alternative to building on the floodplain other than wholesale 
industrial and population migration from the area. The absence of al-
tern ate building sites, however, is the exceptional case. The real rea-
sons for continued floodplain development lie in economics, human na-
ture, and the present state of the law. 
The dangers of future floods are intangible to the human mind, 
while the aesthetic and economic advantages of locating near rivers 
can be quite concrete.17 Even after disaster actually strikes, humans 
generally try to forget and plod onward. Further, human psychology 
and the market encourage a floodplain replay of Professor Hardin's 
tragedy of the commons:18 each development on the floodplain in-
creases the destructive potential of floods; yet each owner who can 
profit from encroaching can rationally ignore the encroachment effect, 
because the increment in danger to him is negligible compared to his 
gain. The adverse flood effects he imposes upon others are too diffuse 
or commingled in the common resource pool to be charged against 
him. Since every decisionmaker shares essentially the same reason-
ing, and since the profit and tax effect of each; encroachment en-
then existing. TASK FORCB REpORT, supra note 11, at 11; G. WHITE, CHANGES IN 
URBAN OCCUPANCE OF FLOOD PLAINS IN TIm UNITED STATES 6 (1958). 
16. The force of tradition, inertia, and economics is made evident by the failure 
of government attempts to relocate citizens after flood disasters. See F. MURPHY, 
supra note 10, at 115. 
17. In addition to the obvious aesthetic, recreational, production, and transport fea-
tures of riverfront location, floodplain parcels are often attractively inexpensive, avail-
able in larger blocs, and strategically located near developed areas. Moreover, they 
do not require extensive grading and site preparation. Where governmental control 
works or other subsidies are available, floodplain investment can produce windfall prof-
its for land speculators. 
18. Hardin, The Tragedy oj the Commons, 162 ScmNCB 1243 (1968). In this pro-
vocative article Hardin analogized environmental degradation in general, and specifi-
~ally overpopulation, to communal use of grazing pasture. The commons can absorb 
only a fixed number of cow user units without deteriorating; yet each herdsman exer-
cising freedom of choice will try to add more cows to his herd beyond that optimum 
number even though the common resource is thereby diminished, because he himself 
will realize the net value of almost one full cow for each addition while sharing the 
detriment with all users of the common. All other herdsmen are similarly encouraged 
to escalate the exploitation, and each must do so just to remain even in the competi-
tion. The result of freedom of action in the commons is eventual destruction of the 
common resource. 
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courages other landowners to develop or depart, the floodplain en-
vironment suffers the total effect of many encroachments-higher and 
higher floods.19 
Market value is a mirror of human irrationality on the flood-
plain, acting as a catalyst to the development process that produces 
flood disasters. Economists argue that the market is supremely rational 
in weighing dangers. They assume that people who know of hazards 
will consider them in arriving at purchase prices and development de-
cisions, and they implicitly postulate that all danger costs are felt by 
some actor in the market process. Neither assumption is tenable. 
The floodplain land market can only reflect the aggregate wisdom of 
the least discriminating class of buyers. Market values are set by the 
highest prices that are being offered consistently for similar floodplain 
parcels; presumably persons who ignore the, flood hazard offer the 
highest prices.20 
The law today, in various guises and in disparate ways, ag-
gravates the flood situation by ignoring its dangers. Since property 
taxes are based upon market value, tax law makes market value a 
self-fulfilling prophecy by encouraging a landowner to develop in or-
der to pay the taxes on his property's developmental value. More 
significant in perpetuating the floodplain conflict, however, are the leg-
islative and judicial policies that succeed in hiding the true costs of 
floodplain development from private decisionmakers. 
Dams, levees, and other controls works authorized by legislatures 
and built by eager governmental beavers are prime examples of public 
19. The development pressure on the property owner comes not only from increas-
ing tax assessments as neighboring floodplain parcels are accorded higher market values 
for development, but also from the increasing flood heights he can expect to encounter 
if he too does not fill in the floodplain area. Though Hardin does not explore the 
issue beyond advising "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon," the only way to pre-
vent eventual destruction of the commons is to create binding agreements or regula-
tions between various users to prevent use beyond the eqUilibrium point, or to create 
some direct accountability market mechanism so that each user must confront the full 
detrimental effects he causes by exceeding the optional limits. 
20. Alternatively, buyers who know about .the flood hazard can ignore it for other 
reasons, because public subsidies or weaknesses in tort remedies allow them to exter-
nalize costs caused on and off the site. Paradoxically, in some other situations the 
highest prices are offered by those who cannot afford to pay for safety. Intensive 
low quality residential use is often the market's highest use for urban floodplains where 
industrial and commercial users find it more practical to build elsewhere. "[T]he Ur-
ban ecology of North American cities leads to the settlement of ghettos in low-lying 
areas." Meier, Insights Into Pollution, 37 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 211, 216 (1971). 
The reality of povery limitations on freedom of choice argnes forcefully against econo-
mists who would leave floodplain settlement patterns up to open bargaining in the mar-
ketplace. 
208 
Floodlines and the Police Power 
subsidy for floodplain developers. These works substantially reduce the 
risks and dangers of floodplain location at no cost to the local land-
owners beyond payment of ordinary taxes.21 Whether dams are built 
to protect existing private investments or to promote future develop-
ment, they make land development more profitable and encourage fur-
ther development. 22 Protection works, however, are a dangerous sub-
sidy. At best they never afford 100 percent protection against floods, 
and they may be overtopped in any year due to human error, unusual 
combinations of natural conditions, or increases in river flows be-
yond design capacity.23 Since the waters from a failing dam strike 
owners who, without the false security of the control works, would 
have built elsewhere, the devastation may be far greater than it would 
have been without the dam. Even if the works never fail, their enor-
mous economic and environmental cost still represents a gratuitous 
public payment to support the profitability of private development that 
otherwise might have been prompted to occupy safer uplands.24 
Federal flood insurance, which received much attention during 
the months after the 1972 floods, represents another counterproductive 
subsidy. The flood insurance statute attempts to discourage further 
floodplain development by making land use regulation a precondition 
to issuance of subsidized insurance policies and by refusing to subsi-
dize any development not existing at the time of federal certification 
of the local program.25 In practice, however, this program shows the 
classic flaws of current flood policy. It encourages continuation of 
existing development that might otherwise relocate by providing prem-
21. Analysis of cost extemalizations is increasingly a basic feature of contemporary 
environmental policymaking. See generally K. BOULDING, ECONOMICS OF POLLUTION 
(1971); R. KNEESE & B. BOWER, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANALYSIS (1969); ORGANI-
ZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PROBLEMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ECONOMICS (1972). 
22. See Miller & Simmons, Crisis on Our Rivers, in McCLELLAN, LAND USE IN nIB 
UNITED STATES 100, 104 (1971). Promotion of future development on the floodplain 
is often a "benefit" justification for government dams and control works. TASK FORCE 
REpORT, SUpra note 11, at 20. 
23. It is not feasible to build the failproof dam; most dams are constructed to a 
250-year frequency level, and even this margin of safety can be frustrated by rising 
flood levels or human error. In some circumstances the government may be liable for 
dam failures. See Barr v. Game, Fish & Parks Comm'n, 30 Colo. App. 482, 497 P.2d 
340 (1972). 
24. Flood control dams are often impractical for multiple use because of required 
major fluctuations in pool levels. The official cost-benefit ratios are likewise arguably 
inflated and often marginal in any event. Recent federal proposals would require some 
beneficiaries to share in the cost of public works projects. NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, 
WATER POLICIES FOR nIB FUTURE 497-98 (1973). 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4015 (1970), as amended, P.L. 93-243, § 103 (Dec. 31, 1973). 
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ium subsidies up to 99 percent; it depends upon disjointed local regula-
tions that have been riddled with large constitutional loopholes per-
mitting floodplain development; it has stretched under development 
pressure to allow subsidy for new construction; and since developers 
who build before 'the H.U.D. Secretary certifies the local flood in-
surance program are virtually assured of subsidized insurance, it ac-
tually operates to encourage rapid new floodplain settlement.26 
Flood relief is another dysfunctional aspect of current govern-
JIlental policy. As the 1972 floods demonstrated, floodplain occu-
pants can expect massive federal, state, and local efforts to rescue them 
and their property, to provide relief, welfare, and reconstruction funds, 
and to absorb disruption and restoration costS.27 Since floodplain oc-
cupants are legally liable for none of these external costs, they do not 
enter into the market decision to develop. To be sure, each individual 
owner risks injury, disease, or death, and his property may be soaked, 
crushed, buried in mud, or floated away.28 When he weighs the dan-
26. The current flood insurance program is filled with anomalies. Subsidized rates 
generally encourage those who might relocate to stick around for one more disaster. 
Recent modification of the statutory ban on subsidized rates for new construction 
is even more disturbing. Although § 4015(c) prohibited subsidized rates for new con-
struction once an area has been designated as susceptible to "special flood hazards," 
42 U.S.C. § 4015(c), HOD temporarily "suspended" this prohibition due to "substantial 
delays" in specifically designating the qualified areas. Instead, local communities must 
determine that new construction sites are "reasonably safe from flooding." 24 C.F.R. 
§ 1910.3 (1973). This provision may actually encourage floodplain development, since 
developers will hasten to build before local communities' participation in the program 
eliminates the opportunity for subsidies. Some Communities are reportedly delaying 
participation to accommodate the developers. Telephone interview with Federal Insur-
ance Administrator's Office, Nov. 1, 1972. 
While the recent flood insurance act amendment asserts the policy of relocating 
development out of the floodplains, it nevertheless undermines that policy. It allows 
subsidized insurance rates for new construction until Dec. 31. 1974, or the publication 
of federal insurance rate maps (not the more available and logical flood hazard maps) 
whichever comes later. P.L. 93-243, § 103 (Dec. 31, 1973). In light of the greatly 
increased subsidized coverages (from $5000 to $100,000 in some cases) and the timing 
of the new program, the new statute appears strongly to encourage the rapid develop-
ment of floodplains. Against these provisions, the accelerated flood hazard mapping 
provisions, ide at § 204, and mandatory local participation, ide at §§ 201(d), 204, are 
insignificant improvements in the program. 
27. Floodplain occupants in 1972 received $172.5 million out of the regular disas-
ter relief budget, $200 million voted by Congress as temporary relief, imd $1.3 billion 
to finance donations of $5000 apiece to floodplain homeowners and low interest recon-
struction loans beyond that figure. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1971, at 13, col. 1. Beyond 
dollars, a substantial number of fatalities were rescue workers; workers took weeks to 
restore public services; jobs and local economies were disrupted; and the life of many 
affected communities has not yet returned to normal. 
28. The range of medical problems encountered in the wake of a flood extends 
beyond typhoid and dysentery. Following the devastating floods in the Northeast in 
the late spring of 1972, doctors in that area braced for a surge of psychiatric problems, 
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gers and odds of developing on the floodplain against its various at-
tractions, however, the individual can discount many of his own po-
tential costs thanks to insurance or relief, and he can completely ig-
nore almost all damages imposed upon the public at large. 
The common law, which in other circumstances often acts as a 
cost internalizer,29 has abetted legislatures in hiding the true cost of 
floods by severely limiting liability for flood damages. For example, 
a developer may decide to build a residential subdivision in the 100-
year floodplain because land is cheap, consolidated in a large parcel, 
~d has an alluring view of the nearby river. If he can expect unin-
formed buyers pressured by the housing shortage to purchase most of 
his units within a few years despite the flood hazard, the profit incen-
tive will encourage him to take .the short-term risk of building there 
rather than on a more expensive upland location.8o In the absence of 
fraud, misrepresentation, or subdivision regulations incorporating flood 
criteria, neither the law nor the economics of his decision will force 
him to consider the long-term plight of his customers.81 
Even more deficient, from a resource cost internalization point of 
view, are the limitations of liability for injuries he inflicts off the 
floodplain site. The physical consequences of floodplain development, 
of course, reach far beyond injuries to the subject parcel and its occu-
pants.82 Some legal sanctions accompany the local offsite effects of 
floodplain development. Physical obstructions of the floodway can 
severely interfere with local flow characteristics by catching debris and 
including suicides, attributable to the feeling of futility brought on by personal and 
property losses. American Medical News, July 24, 1972, at 1, 3. 
29. See Michelman, Book Review, 80 YALE L.r. 647 (1971); Wright, The Cost-
Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 STAN. L. REv. 383 (1969). 
30. Subdivisions in floodplains are apparently not a rare occurrence. See Ameri-
can Land Co. v. Keene, 41 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1930); Turner v. County of Del Norte, 
24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 CaL Rptr. 93 (1972); Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 
151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964). Subdivision regulations, however, have begun 
to incorporate flood considerations. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 560.117, 
as amended, (Supp. 1973-74). 
31. Providing flood information to lending institutions, including the FHA and 
VA, could help to internalize the onsite flood hazard costs, but this would entail ex-
tensive administrative costs. Current practice incorporates flood hazard information 
only where obvious riverside location, recent flood memories, federal input from the 
insurance program, or other volunteered information raise the issue. ct. P.L. 93-234, 
§ 102(a)(b) (attempting to tie federally supported financing to a flood insurance re-
quirement that would theoretically be based upon flood hazard information). The 
identification of areas remains a problem. 
32. The primary offsite damage is due to the encroachment effect, but onsite septic 
systems, industrial chemicals, and flotsam also account for ~uch offsite damage. 
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causing upstream ponding, deflections,· and scouring. If neighbors can 
establish prospective injury or past causation due to these local ef-
fects with enough specificity to convince courts, they can ground liabil-
ity in traditional tort or riparian rights theories.33 To the extent that 
a developer can anticipate such liability, he can internalize these costs 
in his development decisions. The difficulty of proving specific dam-
ages attributable to specific tortfeasors, however, is a major obstacle to 
common law relief, especially where the hydrologic and economic in-
jury effects of local obstructions commingle with those of myriad 
anonymous upstream users. The same difficulty renders injunctions 
for prospective injury virtually impossible. Moreover, even if local 
effects can be proved, the common law tort and riparian rights theories 
may be useless in states that apply the common enemy rule to floods3-1 
or limit landowners' liability to injuries caused by floods that are not 
extraordinary.31> 
The difficulties of apportioning liability for local effects are minis-
cule compared with the immense problems attendant to the legal in-
ternalization of a floodplain development's extended downstream costs. 
Except for the situation in which a piece of debris clearly identifiable 
to a particular source causes the downstream damage, the difficulties 
of measurement and attribution of the extended effects of any single 
floodplain development make general tort theories unworkable. Even 
if causation were provable, the act of God defense, limitations on negli-
gence in the case of "extraordinary floods," and other restrictions on 
liability operate to make recovery of damages from those not left 
33. Proof of local damage causation is hydrologically difficult in many cases for 
obvious reasons. Where such proof is possible, liability usually follows as in the case 
of channel obstructions. "The flood channel of the stream is as much a natural part 
of it as the ordinary channel . • .• With this flood channel no one is permitted 
to interfere to the injury of other riparian owners." 3 H. FARNHAM, WATER AND WA-
TER RIGHTS 2562 (1904) (apparently referring to floodway encroachments). This 
may explain why no challenges to floodplain regulations have come from floodway en-
croachers. 
34. A number of jurisdictions, including California, have applied the common en-
emy doctrine. See, e.g., Costello v. Bowen, 80 Cal. App. 2d 621, 182 P.2d 615 (1947). 
See also cases cited Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 750, 752-56 (1952). Other courts reach the 
same result by saying that defendants will not be liable for damage caused by acts 
of God or the vicissitudes of nature. E.g., Cole v. Bradford, 52 Ga. App. 854, 184 
S.E.901 (1936). 
35. The distinction between extraordinary and ordinary floods as a defense to tort 
claims for damages caused by structural encroachments on flood channels appears 
throughout the cases, but no exact definition of "extraordinary flood" exists. One 
flood was defined as extraordinary because it had been equalled or exceeded only twice 
in the memory of witnesses. Kansas City M. & B. R.R. v. Smith, 72 Miss. 677, 17 
So. 78 (1895). See also cases cited Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 447,452 (1953). 
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judgment-proof improbable. When applied to prospective floods the 
grounds for liability are even more conjectural. 
B. Governmental Policy Choices for the Future 
Only three general policies are available in the face of the escalat-
ing conflict along our rivers. We can continue the present system of 
confrontation, supporting private floodplain development both before 
and after floods as a common burden; we can conquer rivers so that 
they never again will dare to threaten American lives or property; or 
we can disengage and try to live at peace with nature. 
Current flood policy is notably inadequate to protect lives and 
property, and it wastefully misallocates resources. Besides the dam and 
levee approach, other techniques have been proposed or implemented, 
including flood forecasting, floodproofing, and flood information for the 
market,36 but none of these techniques promises an effective, general 
solution for the problem. Moreover, the encouragements to develop-
ment like subsidies and cost insulations make sense only if they imple-
ment some specific policy of promoting floodplain development. No 
such national policy has been articulated. Instead, the current system 
apparently sprang up by default, protecting private property in the 
floodplain on the danger-disregarding presumptions that all private 
property assigned developmental market value must be developable and 
that government owes protection and support to floodplain occupants.37 
So long as alternate locations for development are economically avail-
36. Flood forecasting by the U.S. Weather Service (National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration) is of tactical benefit, but it is hardly an adequate protection 
for most nonevacuatable development. Floodproofing requires investment that could 
be avoided entirely in alternative locations; its prime utility is for existing development 
and situations where floodplain locations must be used for lack of alternatives. See 
SHEAFER, INTRODUCTION TO FLOOD PROOFING (1967); U.S. ARMy CORPS OF ENGI-
NEERS, FLOOD PROOFING REGULATIONS (1972). 
37. Several cases have indicated that local governments cannot restrict normal mar-
ket development where it will add new governmental burdens; nor can municipal serv-
ices be denied to achieve the same result. See Reid Dev. Corp. v. Township of Parsip-
anny-Troy Hills, 10 N.J. 229, 89 A.2d 667 (1952); Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town 
of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 A. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1938); National Land & Inv. 
Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). The 
argument could be made that flood protection works and flood relief are a normal ob-
ligation of government, not to be avoided by land use restrictions. See Dunham, Flood 
Control Via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1098, 1125-27 (1959) [hereinafter 
cited as Dunham, Flood Control]; ct. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 
(1964). In presuming that market decisions must be supported by government in the 
face of predictable natural hazards, this theory would create a legally novel and irra-
tionally wasteful governmental obligation. 
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able, there is no reason to' think that a policy favoring floodplain de-
velopment is or ever will be desirable. Current .policy continues to 
offer recurring wars of attrition with little rational justification. 
Total conquest of floods is a possible, but iindesirable, alterna-
tive. If the national policy were the total elimination of floodplain haz-
ards, technology as usual has an expensive answer. Technology can 
subject entire watersheds to control by modifyiD.g rainfall patterns, es~ 
tablisliing broad networks of computer-coordinated control works, and 
replacing. rivers with a chain of ponds, dikes, sluices, and watergates 
descending from the highest upland meadows all the way to the sea. 
The direct expense would be formidable, and the consequent loss of 
farmland, open space, water use, and environmental quality would be 
even greater. But we then could build upon ·the floodplain in safety. 
With alternative development locations available, massive public sub-
sidy of private decisions to build in the floodplain would be a sad mis-
allocation of resources. . 
Disengagement from the conflict thus emerges as the most ra-
tional alternative, reducing the area of confrontation between rivers and 
humans by making their mutual uses of river valleys compatible. Basic 
to . this management theory is . the proposition that the only tolerable 
development on the floodplain is that which provides benefits in ex-
cess of all trtIe costs, economic and otherwise, to the resource network 
as a unit. 38 Further, even where net benefits exist, developments that 
impose costs upon public safety and the environment should not be 
built on floodplains if net benefits would be greater, or the costs less, 
in other locations.39 The proposition requires maximization of bene-
fits in use allocations throughout a whole area in light of true costs. 
38. This conclusion is gradually gaining recognition, most recently in the Na-
tional Water Corimlission's draft report, which states that "the material wealth of a na-
tion is not enhanced' by development of any tract of land subject to flood overflow 
unless the net value of the resulting production exceeds the costs of development plus 
the flood losses (or the cost of preventing such losses) [counting] any non-material 
values sacrificed through development [as costs]." NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra 
note 24, at 160. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 
149,-1972 (1971); U.S. Water:Resonrces Council, Unified National Floodplain Man-
agement Program (continuing reports beginning 1971). 
. 39. See TASK FORCE REpORT, supra note 11, -at 14. Uses that currently appear 
to require floodplain location include nuclear power plants (where heavy reactors must 
be transported by barge), utility transmission structures, and water-based recreational 
structures. Each deserves a policy judgment comprehensively comparing probability 
and degrees of damages against benefits. The same kind of decision underlies regula-
tory schemes; we base restrictions on the 100-year rather than the lOOO-year floodline 
because we consider that net benefits of development within the latter line outweigh 
the detriments. . 
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C. Techniques for Resource Regulation: Internalizing External Costs 
The extreme difficulties involved, in quantifying and attributing 
the true costs of individual 4evelopment renders all the available cost 
internalization techniques insufficient to the task of disengaging de-
velopment from the floodplain. In some ~ases the problem with cost 
internalization is political or philosophical~ The governme:pt may be 
thoroughly rational, for example, in attempting to dissuade floodplain 
development by declaring an end to public flood relief. While this 
technique of cost internalization has been seriously suggested and is even 
discernible in recent federal legislation, its political and moral conse;. 
quences make it unthinkable as a general national policy.40 
The practical problems of cost internalization are equally per-
plexing. A government policy of requiring all floodplain occupants 
to purchase flood insurance for themselves at full actuarial rates, for 
example, would totally disregard the offsite costs imposed on down-
stream occupants, effectively encouraging landowners to develop en-
croaching land fills. Recognition of offsite costs, however, requires 
heroic administrative efforts. A legislature could require 'a bond for 
all new floodplain development sufficient to cover the potential pro 
rata share of costs occurring throughout a watershed in the event of 
floods,41 or it could require developers to purchase flood insurance cov-
ering. all onsite and offsite damages caused by development. Alterna-
tively the courts could expand the common law theories of tort liabilitY 
to ground claims throughout a watershed. 42 Each of these compre-
hensive approaches; however, would require an accurate base quantifi-
cation of basin-wide damage that is difficult enough to make after a 
flood and impossible ,in, the. case of prosp~tive floods. Apportion-
ing costs to each floodplain occupant would require endless gradations 
. - . 
40. Milton Friedman seriously suggested this in a recent article. NEWSWEEK, Sept 
4, 1972, at 64. The same rationale supported §. 1314(a)(2) and § 1315 of the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4021-22 (1970), which denied federal 
relief to persons who had the opportunity to enter the _federal flood insurance program 
by implementing floodplain land restrictions. The political- and philosophical difficul-
ties of this approach are shown by the fact that the effective date of the provision 
was repeatedly postponed, Act of Dec. 22, ~971, ·Pjlb. L. No. 92-213, § 2(b), 85 Stat. 
775, and recently repealed. P.L. 93-234, § 203 (Dec. 31, 1973). Ending public flood 
relief, of course, would not internalize offsite costs that a floodplain developer imposes 
on others. 
41. Such broad coverage bonds have not been seriously exanrlned because the ad-
ministrative problem is so complex. Onsite damage bonds are analogous to enforced 
savings programs like social security and workmen'.s compensation plans. . 
42. This alternative would require class action and class defendant provisions far 
beyond the dreams of the d¢ters of rule 23 Qf the.Federal..Rule!, of Ci~ Procedure .. , 
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through the watershed, and the transaction costs in evaluating, litigat-
ing, and paying claims back and forth through the resource network 
would be stupendous. In some cases more simplified internalization, 
such as assessing downstream beneficiaries for their pro rata share of 
the costs of flood control works or requiring "rescue bonds" to cover 
direct public relief costs in the event of flood might be possible, but no 
sufficiently practical and extensive cost internalizing technique pres-
ently exists.43 
The complexities of cost-internalization, however, can be cir-
cumvented by an alternative governmental approach preventing cost 
externalizing uses.44 Land use regulations restricting development, for 
example, act directly to impose a governmental cost-benefit decisioI). 
upon private landowners, instead of attempting to quantify factors to 
be incorporated into the cost-benefit balance of the private market pro-
cess. Preventing externalization thus avoids the practical obstacles that 
dominate cost-internalization techniques, while fulfilling the require-
ments of a rational disengagement policy. 
One obvious method for preventing cost externaIizations is 
government acquisition of property rights.45 Acquisition of floodplain 
lands by purchase or condemnation effectively would reserve them for 
floodflow purposes, provide public parkland (in the case of fee simple 
acquisition), and raise none of the constitutional or political objections 
that plague regulatory measures. Since purchase of the nation's flood-
plains would probably double the national debt, however, this ap-
proach is impractical as a large-scale policy. 46 Land acquisition aJ 
43. In specialized local circumstances some simple cost-internalizing techniques 
may work. See Farb, Let's Plan the Damage, 49 NAT'L CMe REV. 238, 241 (1960). 
While the National Water Commission stresses the approach of making beneficiaries 
pay for river control works, NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 24, at 497-98, it 
advocates land use regulation as an essential element of floodplain management. Id. 
at 154-56, 158-60. 
44. This is the second possible remedy for Hardin's tragedy of the commons. It 
assumes a decision that the externalities are worse than the total cost of suppressing 
the activities. In some cases whether a restriction is a forced internalization or a pro-
hibition of an externalizing use may be an analytically close question. For example, 
a prohibition on poIIuting a river may accomplish a cost internalization if treatment 
equipment is economicaIIy possible, or a prohibition of the industrial activity if it is 
not. 
45. This solution does not entirely avoid the cost externalization phenomenon, 
since the government buys at market prices that ignore the externalized costs attribut-
able to development. 
46. No one has even estimated what the cost would be, but the strategic urban, 
recreational, and commercial locations involved ensure that purchase at current market 
values would be impossibly expensive. The National Water Commission was unenthusi-
astic about acquisition pOlicies. NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 24, at 155-56. 
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"fair market value" also possesses a philosophical shortcoming. Since 
the buyers who set market value can presently disregard offsite costs 
and discount onsite flood risks, government acquisition at market 
prices pays off the landowners' gamble at subsidized profit rates that 
equally ignore those costS.47 Compensable regulations, for all their 
practical advantages, would reflect the same failings.48 
Perhaps the most compelling case for government acquisition con-
cerns existing settlements that are repeatedly threatened by flood disas-
ters, often as a result of general increases in flood levels. In these cir-
cumstances, compassionate public policy would recommend compen-
sated evacuation of entire towns to new upland locations. In prac-
tice, however, this policy has little promise. The cost of buying 
existing development at market rates for the purpose of eliminating 
developed uses is economically prohibitive, and the costs of re-creating 
entire communities is disproportionately high. Moreover, floodplain 
inhabitants doubtless would oppose a forced evacuation from their tra-
ditional homes at a time when a flood is only a possibility.49 Using a 
more fanciful approach, the government could condition rehabilitation 
grants and low interest loans after floods upon the victim's agreement 
to move out of the floodplain, thus "purchasing" property rights with 
relief money. Under this approach, however, victims would reject the 
government's relief offer unless it exceeded the amount a market spec-
ulator would pay for the land. If, for example, the government offered 
relief of $5,000 to persons whose flooded property was worth $6,000 
on the market, they would choose to sell their land or rebuild them-
selves, in either case assuring continued occupancy of the floodable 
land. To prevent further development the government would have to 
A further danger of an acquisition policy is that it might cause general floodplain land 
prices to rise, encouraging owners to develop wherever the government does not buy. 
47. This would be equally true for fee simple and less-than-fee-simple acquisition, 
since the latter price will almost exactly equal the development value of floodplain 
land. In effect, less-than-fee-simple acquisition involves transfer of the private right 
to develop. Many observers assert the futility of this approach, arguing that the gov-
ernment will be paying 90% of market value while obtaining no right of public use 
of lands. C/., W. WHYTE, supra note 3, at 89-117. 
48. See Krasnowiecki & Paul, The Preservation 0/ Open Spaces in Metropolitan 
Areas, 110 U. PA. L REV. 179 (1961). One question rarely addressed in discussion 
of compensable regulations and inverse condemnation is why compensation must be paid 
for the entire market value loss that restrictions cause, rather than merely for the "ex-
cessive" portion of the loss that renders compensation necessary. 
49. "[Tlhat's when I sit on the front porch with a gun," replied Mr. Frank Novak 
of Wilkes-Barre, Pa., to the suggestion that government should move people out of the 
floodplain. Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 21, 1972, at 6, col. 4. See also F. MUR-
PHY, supra note 10, at 113-19. 
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pay at least $6,000. Nonetheless, ,though it would inflate initial relief 
costs, this form of acquisition might be cheaper than straight acquisi-
tion of land, since the government undertakes to pay relief in any event. 
A negotiated purchase after floods would prevent future relief pay-
ments, which could be capitalized toward purchase price. 
D. The Police Power: Floodplain Regulations 
Floodplain regulations are analogous to standard land use dis-
tricting schemes, controlling all uses of land within the hydrologically 
defined areas subject to floods of a designated frequency. Adminis-
tered by a permit or zone procedure, they essentially establish a flood 
set-back rule for most development. Schedules of permitted and pro-
hibited uses usually establish a gradient of restrictions within the flood-
plain area, decreasing in severity at the floodplain's, fringes. 50 Flexi-
bility can be built into regulations through criteria for permits that au-
thorize uses that do not increase flood levels or cause or sustain signifi-
cant damage. Regulations may condition permits on structural modifi-
cations or other changes. When a proposed installation would cause 
increases in flood levels, but its net benefits would outweigh damages, 
it can be subject to special exception procedures. 51 
Applying. use schedules, conditional uses, nonconforming uses, 
and special exception permits necessarily involves legislative and ad-
ministrative balancing procedures, and accommodations with economic 
and political constraints inevitably occur. Existing development, of 
course, presents extremely difficult legal and policy' problems. Al-
though the floodplain situation offers a notable opportunity for amorti-
zation procedures and, in some cases, abatement of existing develop-
50. Thus all structural development or substantial alteration of ground contours is 
generally prohibited within the floodway, with permitted uses limited to low hazard 
uses like agriculture, recreation, and parking. In the flood fringe area, limited nonresi-
dential structural uses may be allowed; at the extremities of the 100-year floodplain, 
limited incursions of filling or other encroachments with minimal adverse hydrological 
effects may be permitted with conditions attached aC,cording to the provisions of special 
exception clauses. Residential uses are usually denied throughout the floodplain, as 
are unprotected utility lines, storage of dangerous chemicals and floatable debris, and 
septic installations. See generally J. KUSLER, WATER REsOURCES POLICY IN WISCONSIN 
-FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT 59-60 (1971); 1 U.S. WATER REsOURCES CoUNCIL, 
REGULATION OF FLOOD HAzARD AREAS TO REDUCE FLOOD LoSSES (1971) [hereinafter 
cited as FLOOD HAzARD AREAs]; Note, Recent Natural Resources Cases, 4 NATURAL 
REsOURCES J. 445 (1965). 
51. A special exception, allowing variations from an ordinance when the proposed 
use is consistent with the purposes of the ordinance, is the proper form; variances that 
issue to avoid unconstitutional hardship are not the proper form in such ~ircumstances. 
218 
Floodlines and ithe Police Power 
ment, current regulations that lack cost internalization mechanisms 
generally do no more than restrict existing development to the pro-
visions for nonconforming uses. 52 Over time, however, the combina-
tion of controls on existing development and restrictions against new 
investment can direct development away from floodplain locations. 
The similarity of floodplain regulations to other established land 
use regulations makes them relatively easy to initiate and administer. 
Several adequate model ordinances exist, backed by a fairly extensive 
legal commentary. 53 Authority to issue regulations at the local level 
usually is present in general zoning and police power enabling acts;54 
if not, the notoriety of recent floods should reduce the difficulty of ob-
taining specific legislative authorization. In practice, zoning authorities 
can incorporate floodplain districts as overlays on existing zone maps, 
or they can administer them separately. 55 In either event, the graphic 
nature of the basic floodplain maps makes them easy to comprehend 
and apply, facilitating public notice, incorporation in title records, 
administrative handling, and judicial review. Conscientiously ad-
ministered regulations, of course, impose costs upon government 
treasuries; base data, mapping, drafting, and enforcement procedures 
52. Most land use regulations contain nonconforming-use provisions. While the 
reason for including them may be fear of constitutional invalidity, see State ex rei. 
Nealy v. Cole, 442 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. App. 1969), in In re South of Ann Drive, 34 
App. Div. 2d 412, 312 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1970), political concerns were equally important 
to the planners who spawned the concept late in the 1920's. See 1 R. ANDERsoN, 
AMEru:CAN LAw OF ZONING § 6.02, at 308-09; § 6.06, at 318-19 (1968). If a noncon-
forming use is in the nature of a nuisance, it is more susceptible to termination by 
so-called retroactive zoning or amortization. See More, The Termination of Noncon-
forming Uses, 6 WM. & MARY L REv. 1 (1965); Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nui-
sances, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 467-70 (1941). 
53. For examples of model ordinances see AMEru:CAN Soc'y OF PLANNING OFFI-
CIALS, REGULATIONS FOR FLOOD PLAINS, Rep. No. 277, at 43 (1972); FLOOD H.AzAru> 
AREAs, supra note 50; Hines, Howe & Montgomery, Suggestions for a Model Flood 
Plain Zoning Ordinance, 3 LAND & WATER L REv. 321 (1970); LEXINGTON, Ky. CITY-
COUNTY PLANNING COMM'N, DRAFT FLOODPLAIN ORDINANCE (1973). None satisfacto-
rily compels specific identification of all public harms as suggested here, but each sup-
plies a workable basis for rational floodplain management systems. Cf. MICHIGAN 
DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES, OFFICE OF PLANNING SERVICES, MODEL ZoNING ORDI-
NANCES: NATURAL RIvER ZONE (draft of Feb. 3,1973) (drafted by author). 
54. Floodplain regulation implemented for traditional pOlice power purposes can 
usually be subsumed under general statutory delegations to local governments. State-
wide regulation, of course, would require new statutory authority for an administrative 
agency, unless zoning statutes with sufficient scope already exist. See FLOOD H.AzAru> 
AREAs, supra note 50, at 126-99, 242-70. Cf. HAWAII REv. STAT. Ch. 205 (1968), as 
amended, (Supp. 1969). 
55. The latter solution may be simplest, but there is no organic reason why the 
structural restri.ction in floodplain regulations cannot be fully incorporated in a build-
ing code. Many states also insert flood consideration into subdivision regulations. See, 
e.g., MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. §§ 560.116-17, as amended, (SuPp. 1973-74). 
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require substantial public expenditures. The costs of administering a 
floodplain management system, however, are infinitesimal compared 
to the cost of a single dam or a major flood. If conscientiously and 
comprehensively administered throughout a watershed, floodplain reg-
ulations can exclude all uses that pose dangers to floodplain inhabitants, 
but allow special uses in which the necessity for particular developments 
outweighs the disutility of their placement. 
In practice, however, the regulatory approach has had its fail-
ings. Most of the more than 500 units of government that have pro-
mulgated floodplain management legislation are low-level governmental 
entities that rarely attempt to coordinate their efforts within watershed 
systems. 56 Without coordinated basin-wide management policies, the 
fragmented administration of floodplain regulations severely limits their 
effectiveness. State level regulation is probably the most practical 
method to bring entire watersheds up to minimum regulatory levels. 
Though states are generally chary of invading the political domain of 
local governments, a firmly established trend points in that direction. 51 
Raising the level of governmental control has other benefits. Technical 
information, which currently represents substantial opportunity costs 
to small towns, can be generated more easily at the state level. Com-
munication with relevant federal agencies maybe easier. Removal of 
administration from the local level may alleviate heavy local pressures 
for modification, and state level regulation'may possess enhanced stand-
ing in court. 
Though the form and content of existing legislation are generally 
adequate to meet the requirements of the situation, the terms of existing 
regulations are presently adjusted in practice to conform to the pressures 
of private property. Fearing political pressure and reverses in court, 
floodplain administrators at every level are hesitant to enforce regula-
tions that impose major losses in market value, notwithstanding im-
portant public concerns. 58 They are echoed by most of the legal com-
56. The exact number is unclear, but is certainly growing rapidly under the in-
fluence of the federal flood insurance program. See 38 Fed. Reg. 1001-17 (1973). 
57. See F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CON-
TROL (1972); the fact that flooding is a basin-wide problem dictates that effective solu-
tions be basin-wide as well. Ct. Susquehanna River Basin Compact, 84 Stat. 1509 
(1970); Delaware River Basin Compact, 75 Stat. 688 (1961). In practice, however, 
these compacts seem to prefer dams to land use controls. Unfortunately, the federal 
flood insurance program encourages a checkerboard of local rather than state regula-
tion. 
58. Given the uncertain nature of takings tests, administrators are understandably 
reluctant to risk judicial and political battles. Liberal grants of variances and amend-
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mentators, who generally counsel that regulations are unassailable if 
they do not substantially erode private property values. 59 Floodplain 
regulations, of course, generally do just that, severely diminishing prop-
erty values by preventing development of land whose value primarily 
lies in its development potential. 
Floodplain restrictions exemplify a classic dilemma in contem-
porary resource management regulations. Severe misallocations of costs 
exist, and they can be adequately handled only through comprehensive 
and detailed regulatory control of resource uses. But private property 
lines and market processes disregard the majority of criteria relevant 
to the public interest, producing major disparities between private and 
public conceptions of land use goals. From these disparities emerges a 
new confrontation between different forces in our legal system. 
n. The Constitutional Dilemma in Resource Regulation 
Environmental land use regulations are inevitably prone to con-
stitutional attack, not only because they seek to prevent cost externaliza-
tions that courts do not customarily recognize, but also because they 
drastically curtail the market value of private property, posing a sharp 
constitutional conflict between public and private interests. The num-
erous successful constitutional challenges to floodplain regulations have 
been particularly disappointing. 60 More fundamental than the regula-
ments are the result, despite theoretically stringent requirements for granting them. 
Variances theoretically provide flexibility in regulatory schemes where private property 
rights in specific individual circumstances would otherwise be unconstitutionally vio-
lated (as contrasted with special exception permits that allow flexibility for regulatory 
policy purposes). Yet variances in practice become political footballs, and they are 
granted for a frustratingly broad and arbitrary range of reasons. See Dukeminier & 
Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in Misrule, 50 Ky. Lor. 
273, 324-30 (1962); cf. Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 75-76, 24 N.E.2d 851, 852-
53 (1939). Since administrative grants of variances are rarely appealed, the many 
cases in which courts order such grants may only be the tip of the iceberg. Until 
strong constitutional support for such regulations emerges, administrators will be 
tempted to allow them to erode under attack by property owners. Pressured amend-
ments of zoning ordinances, however, may often be attacked as "spot zoning." See 
1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 52, at §§ 5.04-.13 (1968). Note that governments may find 
themselves held liable in tort for unwisely permitting floodplain development. See 
Eschete v. City of New Orleans, 258 La. 134,245 So. 2d 383 (1971). 
59. See, e.g., FLOOD HAzARD AREAS, supra note 50, at 29, 36. 
60. Apparently, "there is a hierarchy [of constitutional values] •.• in which the 
right to profit stands first, with a grudging exception for exigent public need." Sax, 
supra note 38, at 149 n.7. In the leading case, Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning 
Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964), the court declared a floodplain ordi-
nance unconstitutional. Four of the following seven cases reached the same result. Or-
dinance void as applied: Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24, 282 A.2d 907 
(1971); Sturdy Homes, Inc. v. Township of Redford, 30 Mich. App. 53, 186 N.W.2d 
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tions' dismal court record, however, is the inadequacy they reveal in 
today's judicial takings tests. The courts, instead of exploring the 
subtle balance between private and public interests, chose to apply the 
narrow, traditional language of Mr. Justice Holmes' diminution test, 
which focuses primarily on the decrease in value of private property 
caused by a police power regulation. In practice, the courts appear to 
resolve the illogic of the theory, especially in cases involving very 
serious public concerns, by striking an unspoken balance between pri-
vate regulatory losses and some unspecified form of public interest. 
Even where implicit balancing is possible, however, the weighing of 
public interest considerations is necessarily haphazard, and the diminu-
tion test tends to bias the takings question in favor of supporting 
market values. The floodplain cases' extreme fact situations, involv-
ing novel police power objectlves and dramatic erosions of market 
value, offer a magnificent opportunity to clarify some of the toughest 
constitutional questions and environmental issues in contemporary 
property law, but the courts have ignored their chance. Unless they 
revise outmoded takings tests, however, the resulting limited utility of 
floodplain regulations and environmental measures like them will dis-
courage their use by resource managers. 
The courts need not establish an entirely novel takings test. By 
incorporating into judicial review the full range of considerations that 
produce legislative decisions to regulate in the first place, they need 
only rework the current takings test that presently threatens environ-
mental regulations. That expanded judicial awareness will clarify 
what is not a taking. In many situations this will result in strong judi-
cial support for uncompensated government regulation where today 
private property receives more sympathetic judicial treatment. No 
apology is necessary for that result, however, if it is the consequence 
of considering previously ignored constitUtional interests. Moreover, 
the legislature, if it desires, can still compensate for floodplain land re-
strictions. Balancing private losses against public costs only answers 
43 (1971); Hofkin v. Whitemarsh Township, 88 Montg. Co. 68, 42 Pa. D. & C.2d 417 
(Pa. C.P. 1967). Ordinance void: Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township 
of Parsipanny-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963') (wetlands ordinance de-
fended on floodplain rationale). Ordinance upheld: Turner v. County of Del Norte, 
24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Ded-
ham, - Mass. -, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973) (insuf-
ficient loss to constitute taking); Solomon v. Whitemarsh Township, 92 Montg. Co. 
114 (Pa. C.P. 1969) (no property value loss). For a catalog of prior cases raising 
similar issues, see FLOOD HA.zAru> AREAs, supra note 50, at 467-71. 
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the very different question of when compensation is constitutionally 
required. 
A. Floodplain Regulations in Court 
Purely practical considerations partially explain the failure of some 
floodplain regulations. In most cases neither the legislature nor the 
regulations' defenders had sufficiently developed supporting data.61 
Further, the floodplain regulations so far challenged in court on tak~ 
ings grounds have all been based upon local ordinances rather than 
state level regulations. In practical terms, a local ordinance-whose 
promulgating "legislature" may be a three-man majority on the town 
council exercising delegated power--doubtless enjoys a less compelling 
presumption of legislative validity in court than an equivalent piece 
of state legislation. These tactical considerations, however, appear in-
significant when compared to the variety of constitutional onslaughts 
directed at floodplain regulations. 
The Supreme Court delivered its classic, but unenlightening, 
standard for constitutional review of police power legislation in 1893, 
in the well-preserved case of Lawton v. Steele. 62 The Court stated: 
To justify the state in . . . interposing its authority in behalf 
of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the 
public . • . require such interference; and, second, that the 
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of 
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 63 
In modern takings decisions this statement has three general elements. 64 
61. None of the voided regulations was based on hydrologically defined flood fre-
quency projections. The Dooley record indicated that the ordinance was based on 
rough historical records of the 1938, 1944, and 1954 floods. Record at 186. The 
court relied on the fact that much of the regulated property was "on good high 
ground." 151 Conn. at 311, 197 A.2d at 773. Counsel in all but the most recent cases 
apparently did not understand the physical or legal characteristics of the floodplain. 
ct. Sturdy Homes, Inc. v. Township of Redford, 30 Mich. App. 53, 186 N.W.2d 43-
(1971), where land within the 100-year floodplain (the property appears within the 
lOO-year line in U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS-DETROIT DIsrRICT, FLOODPLAIN IN-
FORMATION-UPPER RIvER ROUGE, plate 5 (1971» was apparently reviewed accord-
ing to limited seasonal flood data. TUrner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal .. App. 
3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972), and Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, -
Mass. -, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), ceTt. denied, 409' U.S. 1108 (1973), show far more 
sophisticated discussions. -
62. 152 U.S. 133 (1894). 
63. ld. at 137. Justice Clark testified to the continuing validity of this statement 
in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
64. See, e.g., Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Du Page County, 11 Ill. App. 3d 386, 
298 N.E.2d 259 (1973); Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 
341, 271 A.2d 430 (1970). For recent discussions of judicial criteria used to test 
zoning regulations see Ford, Guidelines fOT Judicial Review in Zoning Variance Cases, 
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To uphold the validity of police power legislation, a public purpose 
must motivate the law;65 the restriction selected must be reasonably 
related to the public objective;66 and the resulting burden must not be 
"unduly" or "excessively" oppressive upon affected individuals. 67 The 
floodplain cases raise questions in all three areas, though ultimately 
the third, in the guise of the diminution test, dominates the cases. 
The leading case, Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission,68 
is typical of the other floodplain cases in both facts and law. At 
the insistence of the town flood control and erosion board, the Fair-
field, Connecticut Zoning Commission adopted a floodplain district as 
part of its amended zoning map. The ordinance forbade all struc-
tural uses other than marinas, boathouses, clubhouses, landings, and 
docks, and permitted fill only as a special exception within the 404 acres 
situated along a local creek; it also allowed parks, playgrounds, park-
ing, and agriculture. Understandably, the market value of affected 
lands fell sharply. Dooley was a developer who sought to build a 
residential subdivision on floodplain land that he had contracted to 
purchase. With other affected landowners, he challenged the restric-
tion as a taking of property for public use without just compensation. 
Failing at the trial court level, he appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Errors, whieh declared the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to 
plaintiffs' property. 
1. Public Purpose.-The Dooley court actively challenged the 
legislative objective of the Fairfield ordinance, although ultimately it 
did not ground its holding on this argument. 69 While flood control 
58 MAss. L.Q. 15 (1973); Note, Criteria for Determining Constitutionality of Zoning 
Ordinances in Missouri, 35 Mo. L. REV. 572 (1970). 
65. See Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 266 Md. 358, 363, 
293 A.2d 241, 243 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1973). The requirement is 
for a public purpose, not necessarily public use in a literal sense. Cf. Berman v. 
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing 
Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents through Subdivision Exactions, 
73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1122-23 (1964). 
66. See Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wl),lters, 294 U.S. 405, 429 (1935); Nectow 
v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 105 
(1909). 
67. Other wordings of the same concept include "destructive," "confiscatory," and 
"unreasonable." See, e.g., State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 105, 147 A. 294, 299 
(1930); Oak Park Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 10 III. App. 3d 258, 294 N.E.2d 42 
(1973). 
68. 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964). 
69. With regard to congressional objectives, the Supreme Court has said, "Its deci-
sion is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility." United 
States ex reI. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946) (emphasis added); cf. Note, 
,The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance ReqUiem, 58 YALE L.J. 
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was a "laudable . . . and . . . high purpose," the court detected other 
impermissible purposes in the ordinance. 70 The problem lay with the 
legislation's schedule of permitted uses. Since agriculture and the other 
permissible private uses were impractical, the judges felt that the town 
might be trying to obtain free public facilities; the only feasible per-
missible uses were public in nature. 71 Had the court found an im-
proper objective, however, it would presumably have found the ordi-
nance unconstitutional on its face. Since the court made no such 
finding, its holding apparently did not turn upon the public purpose 
argument. Courts in other floodplain cases have similarly raised the 
improper public objective argument without occasioning a general dec-
laration of unconstitutionality. 72 
The Dooley court further hinted that the commission passed the 
ordinance in order to lower future public acquisition costs. Al-
though professing "no reason to doubt" the town's motivation, the 
court twice remarked that permitted uses seemed to "contemplate a 
diminution in land value and subsequent acquisition by some govern-
ment agency."73 The court's suspicions certainly deepened the ordi-
599 (1949). Even proof of ulterior motive has been ignored. See Hetherington, State 
Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L REv. 13, 26-
27 (1958). 
70. 151 Conn. at 308-11, 197 A.2d at 772-73. The court cited Dunham, Flood 
Control, supra note 37 at 1108, in which Professor Dunham argues that requiring cer-
tain uses for public benefit without either reciprocal benefit or compensation to the 
owner is unconstitutional. See also id. at 1121 n.83. 
71. The court felt that "to restrict the use of privately owned property to parks 
and playgrounds bars the development of the land for residential or business purposes 
and raises serious questions as to .•. constitutionality," for the town would be getting 
"public" services for nothing. 151 Conn. at 309, 197 A.2d at 772. 
72. Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24, 30, 282 A.2d 907, 910 (1971); Hof-
kin v. Whitemarsh Township, 88 Montg. Co., 68,42 Pa. D. & C.2d 417 (Pa. C.P. 1967). 
The classic cases are City of Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 136, 
173 A.2d 785 (1961) (zoning for park and playground use) and Miller v. Beaver 
Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951) (zoning for possible future use as a park or 
playground); cf. Regina Auto Constr. Co. v. Regina, 25 W.W.R. (n.s.) 167 (Sask. 1958) 
(zoning for parks permissible so long as title remains in the owner). See also Ameri-
can Nat'} Bank v. Winfield, 1 lll. App. 3d 376, 274 N.E.2d 144 (1971); Morris County 
Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 552-53, 559, 
193 A.2d 232, 240, 243 (1963). 
73. 151 Conn. at 310, 197 A.2d at 773. The record on appeal shows that the town 
was planning to acquire some lands along Pine Creek, that the full extent of planned 
acquisition had not been revealed, and that plaintiffs suspected collusion between the 
zone board and the town in reducing the value of their land for subsequent purchase. 
Record at 234-36. The town has not yet acquired Dooley's land, nor has Dooley built 
his subdivision, because he has been held up by road dedication and excavation prob-
lems. Telephone interview with Fairfield Town Zone and Planning Comm'n, July 
27,1973. 
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nance's troubles,74 but it did not develop the argument further. In 
some of the cases, the diminution test masquerades in public objective 
test disguise. The opinions often contain language condemning regula-
tions because they attempt to take private property for public use,75 
but the courts invariably make this finding only when no profitable 
private use remains. The cases clearly indicate that the courts would 
have reached the same conclusion even if the regulations had not en-
couraged public or quasi-public uses.76 The cases thus turn on the 
regulations' results rather than their purpose.77 This is the essence of 
the diminution test. 
2. Legislative Means.-Since judges are reluctant to second-
guess legislatures, constitutional inquiry into the "reasonable relation-
ship" of means to ends is rare. The courts generally will uphold the 
legislature's choice of means unless the legislation "is futile or has no 
reasonable relation to the relief sought."78 Despite Jusmce Clark's ten-
tative suggestion that one relevant point for judicial consideration might 
be "the availability of other less drastic steps" to achieve the legislative 
objective,79 the only discernible cases in which the courts question 
the reasonable relationship of means to ends involve blatant inaccuracies 
in the factual bases for regulations. In Sturdy Homes, Inc. v. Township 
74. See Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n, 146 Conn. 650, 153 A.2d 822 (1959) 
(floodplain restriction voided for such reasons but reversed on appeal because no evi-
dence of private loss was on the record); McHugh v. City of Dearborn, 348 Mich. 
311, 83 N.W.2d 222 (1957). 
75. Such reasoning appears in Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24, 30-31, 282 
A.2d 907, 910 (1971); Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 308, 
197 A.2d 770, 772 (1964); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Par-
sippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 554-59, 193 A.2d 232,241-43 (1963). 
76. The decision that comes closest to basing its holding on the improper objectives 
test is Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 
N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963), which dwells upon the ordinance's "prime object" in 
conserving park areas, id. at 550-54, 193 A.2d at 239-41, but then uses the Pennsyl-
vania Coal doctrine to void the ordinance as "too restrictive • • . unreasonable and 
confiscatory." ld. at 557, 193 A.2d at 242. 
77. Another question of objective that does not appear in the floodplain cases but 
deserves mention is the assertion that the state may not regulate property to protect 
the property owner from his own conscious acts. Dunham, Flood Control, supra note 
37, at 1108-10, 1125, 1127-28. But legal sanctions against attempted suicide and other 
self-threatening a~ts make this argument obsolete. See Comment, State's Power to Re-
quire an Individual to Protect Himself, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 112 (1969). 
78. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921). Even where evidence is presented 
as to a statute's futility, courts should "not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wis-
dom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy ••• offends the public welfare." 
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1953); see United States 
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1937). 
79. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962). 
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of Redford,80 a Michigan floodplain case, the court noted evidence that 
factual data supporting the zone on the plaintiffs parcel was incorrect. 
Affirming the trial court's finding that plaintiffs land was separated 
from the flood area, the court questioned whether the restriction was 
factually related to the flood control objective. In voiding the ordi-
nance as applied, however, the court dwelt at far greater length upon 
plaintiffs loss of value, indicating that the holding rested on diminution 
grounds rather than on the reasonable relationship test. 
3. Individual Regulatory Burden.-All the constitutional paths 
opened in the floodplain cases finally returned to individual property 
loss as the dispositive constitutional test. In determining that a regu-
lation causes excessive individual loss, courts generally characterize 
diminution in one of two ways. They may look to the degree of pri-
vate loss from base value. In taking this approach, they usually speak 
in percentage terms, although they sometimes use less precise terms 
like "substantial loss" or "heavy financial burden."81 Alternatively, 
the courts find confiscation by looking to the amount remaining to the 
owner after the regulation, the residuum. While the floodplain cases 
reflect both approaches, the residuum standard clearly predominates.82 
80. 30 Mich. App. 53, 186 N.W.2d 43 (1971). See also Oakwood at Madison, 
Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 20-22, 283 A.2d 353, 358-59 (1971). 
Flaws in hydrological mapping were not considered sufficient to void the ordinance 
in Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, - Mass. -, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973). 
81. See Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 
244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969); 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 52, § 2.21, 
at 91 n.14 (Supp. 1972). A notable problem in applying the test is defining a base 
figure upon which to calculate the percentage, a problem generally avoided by the re-
siduum approach. The sum could be based on the price of land alone, valued for the 
highest feasible use permitted under existing regulations other than the challenged reg-
ulations, or on market value which may reflect expectations that exisiting regulations 
will be changed through the political process. The last of these should be the general 
valuation rule. See generally I. LEVEY, CONDEMNATION IN U.S.A. 298, 331-46 (1969). 
Ct. Kensington Hills Dev. Co. v. Milford Township, 10 Mich. App. 368, 159 N.W.2d 
330 (1968). 
82. The Dooley court approvingly cited cases that voided a 66 percent diminution. 
151 Conn. at 312, 197 A.2d at 774, citing La Salle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 12 
Ill. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957). In Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24, 282 
A.2d 907 (1971), real estate value dropped from $32,000 to $1000. That the court 
voided the regulations as applied in Sturdy Homes, despite the fact that plaintiffs 
had paid very little for the land, shows that the amount of loss is less important 
than the amount remaining. Even the cases upholding floodplain ordinances use the 
residuum approach to justify their decisions. See, e.g., Solomon v. Whitemarsh Town-
ship, 92 Montg. Co. 114 (Pa. C.P. 1969). 
The language of the floodplain cases also indicates that "the residuum test predomi· 
nates. The Dooley court said that the Fairfield ordinance must fall because it "froze 
the area into a practically unusable state." 151 Conn. at 311, 197 A.2d at 773. In 
Hofkin v. Whitemarsh Township, 88 Montg. Co. 68,42 Pa. D. & C.2d 417 (Pa. C.P. 
227 
Texas Law Review Vol. 52:201, 1974 
Under this approach the feasibility of remaining permitted uses is the 
prime determinant of the challenged regulation's validity; a reasonable, 
practical, or profitable use must remain to the owner. But the test ig-
nores the hazards an individual's property poses to itself and to other 
persons and property. 
B. The Deficiencies 0/ Diminution and the Need to Balance 
The diminution test has its origin in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon83 in which the United States Supreme Court invalidated a 
state statute requiring coal mining companies to leave sufficient coal 
in the ground to support the surface. Indicating that the police power 
had some limits, Justice Holmes stated: "One fact for consideration 
in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it 
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all of the cases there must 
be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the 
act."84 While Justice Holmes did not say whether any other facts 
should be considered, Justice Clark in a later case intimated that in-
dividual loss alone cannot be the measure of constitutionality.85 Un-
fortunately, Justice Clark did not elaborate, and both the state courts 
and the Supreme Court have failed to present a satisfactory alternative 
to the diminution test. 
The dominance of the diminution test is not at all surprising, 
for Holmes' test does possess elements that recommend it as a standard 
1967) the judge noted that permitted profit making uses "are utterly impractical [and 
the] only practical ••• permitted uses [are] profitless." ld. at 70, 42 Pa. D. & C.2d 420. 
83. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For a general discussion of the takings question based 
on Pennsylvania Coal, see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 
(1973). This work offers an intriguing historical background to modem takings dis-
cussions and several policy level strategies (without presenting a judicial takings test) 
for mitigating the force of private property arguments. 
84. 260 U.S. at 414. 
85. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). Justice Clark 
stated that "[a]lthough a comparison of values before and after [restriction] is rele-
vant ... it is by no means conclusive." ld. Yet diminution was apparently his pri-
mary criterion for disposing of the Goldblatt case. He refused to find the total sup-
pression of plaintiffs gravel pit an unconstitutional taking, reasoning that "there is no 
evidence in the present record which even remotely suggests that prohibition of further 
mining will reduce the value of the lot in question." ld. (footnote omitted). Since 
plaintiff did not introduce evidence of any other kind of loss, lack of diminution was 
sufficient grounds for dismissal. It appears that there had been such allegations on the 
record, but Justice Clark did not suggest a remand to obtain further evidence on the 
question. This may demonstrate the general constitutional rule that gravel pits always 
lose. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. 
Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 370 P.2d 342, appeal dismissed, 371 
U.S. 36 (1962). Contra, Terrace Park v. Errett, 12-F.2d240 (6th_Cir. 192.6). 
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of constitutional fairness. It protects individual property interests, 
which have been at the center of constitutional due process at least 
since the Magna Carta.86 While recognizing that some individual losses 
are inevitably necessary to permit government to function, it draws dis-
tinctions between minor and excessive regulatory burdens placed on 
property owners, reflecting a recognition that eminently fair govern-
ment regulations may strike inequitably upon the particular circum-
stances of specific unfortunate individuals. The residuum standard 
provides a base level of protection for individual property rights in 
harsh cases, but allows government the creative opportunity to plan, 
guide, and control property development patterns far beyond the tradi-
tional health and safety scope of the police power. Moreover, when 
reviewing courts look beyond private loss to consider the public in-
terest, the diminution test allows judges to achieve a rough propor-
tionality between private uses and varying degrees of public necessity. 
In theory, the test thus has potential strengths. In practice, how-
ever, the diminution test's weaknesses eclipse its affirmative elements. 
The floodplain cases reveal particularly well the diminution test's 
greatest shortcoming-its tendency to ignore the regulatory circum-
stances surrounding private 10sses.87 The courts in most floodplain 
cases quite properly examined the public interest in deciding whether 
the legislature had a proper regulatory purpose in the first place. But 
they purported to drop public interest considerations in deciding the 
determinative compensation issue. In this way the courts could find 
excessive private loss without even considering the dangers of flooding. 
The legislature's original balancing of interests, however, is as relevant 
to the takings question as it is to the question of authority to regulate. 
Thus, while the diminution test may work very liberal results in zoning 
cases where property usually has a profitable fall-back use, its adoption 
in different fact situations leads courts to ignore the police power's 
fundamental function of protecting against public harms.88 
86. Blackstone states that "[t]here is nothing which so generally strikes the imag-
ination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole 
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things 
of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe." 
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
87. The courts in two recent floodplain cases totally failed to mention flood dan-
gers. Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964); 
Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971). 
88. The courts thus ignore the purpose for which the legislature passed the regula-
tions in the first place. 
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Fortunately, the cour,ts' enchantment with the diminution theory 
does not always stop them from striking a balance between private 
loss and public interest in practice. The degree of loss test, for ex-
ample, apparently asserts that constitutionality can be determined by 
measuring individual loss alone.89 Loss of a certain magnitude will 
automatically constitute a taking; loss of a lesser percentage will not. 
The fact that no court or commentator has ever dared to stipulate such 
a magic magnitude for general application as a takings test illustrates the 
poverty of this approach. 90 Each exercise of the police power is unique, 
and unless concepts of constitutional fairness can be quantified, a 
percentage mark set for one situation should only coincidentally apply 
to another. 
In the absence of a fixed demarcation point, the percentage ap-
proach per se can only serve as a rationalization for judicial decisions. 
The holdings can only be explained by recognizing that in fact, if not 
in theory, courts view more than mere individual loss. In some cases 
courts find impermissible takings when only minor diminutions have 
occurred.91 By contrast, in an astonishing number of other cases 
government actions causing percentage losses of 75 percent and more 
have been upheld. 92 The latter cases are complemented by longstand-
ing jurisprudential support for uncompensated 100 percent diminu-
tions like dynamiting a house in the path of an urban fire or destroy-
ing diseased cattle.98 The wild disparity in holdings has led one com-
mentator to argue that diminution is not the courts' dominant stand-
ard.94 The examples, however, hardly prove the diminution test's 
eclipse. They simply show that the diminution test in practice includes 
89. See text accompanying note 81 supra. 
90. Although some observers recently have tried to find a general standard by 
collating the average diminution percentages in broad random samplings of cases, they 
fail to prove much beyond the unsurprising fact that higher percentage losses tend to 
be stricken more often than smaller ones. See J. KuSLER, supra note 50, at 139, 194-
96 n.3 (1971). The survey did not distinguish among the different factual situations 
and presentations of the cases, but did note that percentage figures have shortcomings 
as standards. 
91. This happens notably in zoning cases where pubUc objectives or governmental 
arbitrariness are attacked. See Scott v. Springfield, 83 TIL App. 2d 31, 226 N.E.2d 
57 (1967); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 NJ. SUper. 11, 
283 A.2d 353 (1971); Newsom, Zoning jor Beauty,S NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1969). 
92. See Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 20 Cal. Rptr. 
638, 370 P.2d 342, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); Sax, Takings and the Po-
lice Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36,41-46 (1964). 
93. E.g., United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952); Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 339, 415-16 (1922); House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control 
Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 391, 153 P.2d 950, 953 (1944). 
94. Sax, supra note 92, at 44. 
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more than mere mechanistic reliance upon a percentage of individual 
loss. When a court proscribes a 66 percent loss, without saying that 
all losses of that degree are unconstitutional, it must mean only that in 
one particular situation it has determined for reasons beyond simple 
percentage that a particular loss of 66 percent is excessive and unrea-
sonable. When it later upholdS a regulation inflicting the same percen-
t.age loss, it must have decided that, for some external reason, a 66 
percent loss is not excessive in the second fact situation. 
The cases also follow an erratic course in defining the property base 
for the diminution measure. The percentage factor can fluctuate wildly 
according to the definition. If a court views only the restricted por-
tion of a holding, it will necessarily find that a regulation causes a 
much larger percentage loss than if it views the entire parcel. In 
State v. lohnson95 the Maine Supreme Cour.t, in sustaining on diminu-
tion grounds an attack on a wetlands regulation governing a portion of 
plaintiffs. property, completely ignored plaintiffs intense development 
of the unregulated portion. Conversely, the courts in traditional 
zoning cases routinely uphold setback regulations that prohibit virtually 
all structural uses on substantial portions of residential lots, basing their 
zoning diminution judgments on the whole parcel. 96 The degree of 
loss inquiry apparently attempts to judge the personal burden imposed 
upon property owners; yet it does so only by viewing arbitrary sub-
divisions of particular holdings.9 '1 Judges have been unclear in their 
definition of the property base for takings purposes since Holmes and 
Brandeis differed over whether the Supreme Court should weigh the 
Pennsylvania Coal Company's restricted coal pillars alone or its whole 
coalfield.98 Since no rational or jurisprudential standards channel ju-
95. 265 A.2d 711, 713 (1970). But ct. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. 
Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965). 
96. Curry v. Young, 285 Minn. 387, 173 N.W.2d 410 (1969) (indicating that set-
back restrictions will be reviewed on the basis of the whole parcel, not the regulated 
portion alone); Hoshour v. County of Contra Costa, 203 Cal. App. 2d 602, 21 Cal. Rptr. 
714 (1962); ct. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. at 
112,206 N.E.2d at 671-72 (the court squarely required profit valuations based on the 
whole "locus" and not merely the regulated portions). This approach is generally com-
mendable. 
97. Unreasonable hardship refers to consequences to the regulated parcel and not 
to plaintiffs personal financial situation. See, e.g., Style Rite Homes, Inc. v. Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals, 54 Misc. 2d 866, 283 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1967). Thus, theoreti-
cally, widows and orphans do not receive special protection from zoning boards and 
reviewing courts; and welfare takes care of hard cases. 
98. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-19 (1922). The courts 
have evolved no rules for defining the basis of the diminution inquiry; in fact, appar-
ently neither courts nor counsel have identified the issue as the strategic point it is. 
231 
Texas Law Review Vol. 52:201, 1974 
dicia1 subjectivity in defining the concept, courts should be reluctant to 
adhere to the degree of loss analysis.99 
Like the degree of loss test, the conceptually defined residuum 
standard of diminution must flex in practice. On its own terms, the 
residuum approach attempts only to define a minimum reasonable use 
that regulators may not take away. Since the courts obviously can-
not declare a single minimum use that would apply to all fact situa-
tions, they must apply the test with the flexibility necessary to assure 
fairness in individual cases. In some cases the residuum standard's 
necessary flexibility is built in; a test requiring some "reasonable" re-
maining use obviously allows freewheeling judicial balancing. And 
even where the words appear to be quite specific, the courts have 
found room for adjustment. 
Courts often read the residuum test to require a "profitable" resid-
ual use. While this profitability standard sounds quite clearcut, the 
decisions employing it demonstrate that the residuum test inevitably in-
corporates numerous subjective variables. Arverne Bay Construction 
Co. v. Thatcher100 is probably the best known decision turning 
upon the profitability of residual permitted uses. Writing for the ma-
jority of the New York Courts of Appeals, Judge Lehman declared 
that since residentially zoned larid had no profitable use for residences 
at that time or for the reasonably foreseeable future, the regulation 
was unconstitutional as applied. . In finding that permitted uses were 
not profitable, he viewed the nature of surrounding development, mar-
ket conditions, and the zone board's plan for orderly area develop-
ment. Presumably agriculture would have been allowed in the resi-
dentially zoned area, and the land could have yielded some small mone-
tary return if planted in wheat or geraniums. If this potential return 
would not constitute "profit" in legal terms, then Judge Lehman's test 
must have incorporated further assumptions to determine what was a 
reasonable rate of return in the circumstances. Analytically, this would 
involve setting a base figure and the reasonable rate that should be 
Only rarely will the courts combine legally separate but contiguous parcels in assessing 
constitutional validity. See Koff v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill, 29 App. Div. 
2d 655, 286 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1968); Sax, supra note 92, at 60. 
99. The approach also produces great potential for private fraud. In several cases 
the courts have rejected attempts to qualify for variances by dividing property so as 
to produce substandard lots, either on grounds implying fraud or that the "trouble 
was of plaintiff's own making." Corsino v. Grover, 148 Conn. 299, 170 A.2d 267 
(1961); Rodee v. Lee, 14 N.J. Super. 188, 81 A.2d 517 (1951); Richman v. Phila-
delphia Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 391 Pa. 254, 137 A.2d 280 (1958). 
100. 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). 
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realized on it. Moreover, Judge Lehman indicated further definitional 
flexibility, in saying that the zone would have been held constitu-
tional if permitted uses would have become "profitable" in a "reason-
able amount of time."lOl Judge Lehman's residuum test, therefore, 
left him ample scope to adjust the contending interests according to 
an implicit balance. 
Granting the possible flexibility within the residuum test, its terms 
nevertheless bias a court's approach in favor of private property. It 
makes consideration of public interest extremely difficult, for example, 
in cases where the only profitable use for a piece of property is highly 
dangerous. If the market assigns its minimum profit expectation to a 
use that possesses great potential for public disaster, like floodplain 
residential development, the residuum definition strictly applied will 
support that use.102 Some regulatory situations may present cases 
where no valuable market use can be consistent with public safety. 
Whether a court would void the restrictions, permitting unlimited de-
velopment, or require prohibitively expensive compensation in such 
cases would depend on how faithful the court is to the residuum test. 
Two recent floodplain cases give fleeting indications that the 
more realistic courts are recognizing that market loss by itself should 
not be dispositive of the takings question. In Turnpike Realty Co. v. 
Town of Dedham/o3 the Massachusetts courts reviewed the floodplain 
literature, analyzed the hydrological characteristics of the subject flood-
plain property, and upheld a zone that allegedly reduced the value of 
the 62 acre parcel from '$431,000 to, $53,000. In the middle of a dis-
cussion on residual uses, the Massachusetts Supreme Court gratuitously 
101. ld. at 224, 15 N.E.2d at 590, 592. 
102. The court in Turnpike Realty CO. v. Town of Dedham, - Mass. -, 284 
N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973), avoided this anomalous result 
only by contorting the concept of profitability. In that case the court upheld a regula-
tion relegating suburban property worth $431,000 to tree nursery use. If the plaintiff 
had paid a $300,000 market value for the land, for instance, a tree nursery or other 
agricultural use would probably not yield a sufficient return on the investment. ct. 
McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953), cert. de-
nied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954). 
Justice Brandeis, attempting to raise this question in Pennsylvania Coal, stated: 
"Restriction upon use does not become inappropriate . • • merely because it deprives 
the owner of the only use to which the property can then be profitably put . . " If 
by mining anthracite coal the owner would necessarily unloose poisonous gases, I sup-
pose no one would doubt the power of the state to prevent the mining without buying 
his coalfields .•.. " 260 U.S. at 418; ct. Spiegle V. Borough of Beach Haven, 46 
N.J. 479, 218 A.2d 129 (1966) (New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to escape the 
anachronisms of the diminution theory by assuming that property value reflects com-
mon sense safety concerns). 
103. - Mass. -,284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973). 
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dropped a< statement that sounded very much like< an explicit recogni-
tion of a balancing test. The court stated: "Although it is clear that 
the petitioner is substantially restricted in its use of the land, such re-
strictions must be balanced against the potential harm to the com-
munity from overdevelopment of a flood plain area. "104 This is pre-
cisely the perspective that the earlier floodplain cases lacked. The 
court was not only recognizing the existence of a balance, but it was 
also specifying that in striking the balance the courts should define 
the public interest in terms of "harms." The innovative implications of 
the statement are obvious, but the court went no further. The hold-
ing quite clearly turned on traditional residuum reasoning. lOIS 
Anticipations of a breakthrough in constitutional takings cases 
were further aroused, and frustrated, in the most recent floodplain 
appeal, Turner v. County of Del Norte.10S The California district 
court upheld a county floodplain ordinance relying on evidence showing 
that a proposed subdivision would create flood hazards to residents 
and property within and outside the zoned area. ''The zoning ordi-
nance in question," the District Court of Appeals wrote in affirming, 
"imposes no restrictions more stringent than the existing danger de-
mands."107 Like the Turnpike Realty court's aside, this statement as-
serts a proportionality between private loss and public hazard. If the 
court had said no more, the language would have implied a new tak-
ings test. Although declaration of a new constitutional principle seemed 
imminent, the court undercut the possibility with its very next sen-
tence. Invoking the classic residuum test, it declared that restrictions 
were not too stringent because "[r]espondents may use their lands in 
a number of ways which may be of economic benefit to them."108 The 
definition of residual beneficial uses in each circumstance, of course, 
allowed some balancing; but the weighing process remained implicit 
and unexplained. Faced with regulatory situations in the floodplain 
cases that should compel judicial recognition of a broader takings for-
mula, the courts have forgone the opportunity to discard or improve 
upon the <iin?inution test.109 
104. Id. at 900 (emphasis added). 
105. In returning to the residuum standard, the court pointed out that "[t]he peti-
tioner. . . has not been deprived of all beneficial uses of its property." Id. at 899. 
106. 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101< Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972). 
107. Id. at 315, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (emphasis added). 
108. Id. 
109. Even cases upholding the most drastic losses do so in euphemistic traditional 
234 
Floodlines and the Police Power 
Even Holmes apparently recognized that public considerations 
were necessary to the application of his handiwork. Although he spoke 
in terms of private loss in Pennsylvania Coal, his reasoning did not ig-
nore the constitutional balancing of public versus private interests. 
He recognized that government "could hardly go on if to some extent 
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for 
every such change."llo Thus, Holmes noted a balance that turned in 
part upon the weight of the public interest. If, he said, the Court's re-
view of the legislation had been limited to the two plaintiffs' houses 
on one hand and the coal property on the other, the statute clearly 
would not "disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so exten-
sive a destruction of the defendanfs constitutionally protected 
rights."l11 But the intervention of the Attorney General of Pennsyl-
vania and the neighboring coal country city of Scranton into the plain-
tiffs action brought a wider public interest into Holmes' treatment of 
the case, forcing him to go further into the question than he would have 
gone if only two plaintiffs' interests were endangered. To determine 
whether the coal company had suffered a taking, he then examined 
whether considerations supporting the statute disclosed a "public in-
terest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction. "112 Holmes' 
answer ultimately was that they did not,113 but the way he had framed 
the question is far more instructive than his conclusion on the facts. 
By indicating that the constitutional conflict could have opposite out-
comes--depending upon the amount of public interest, while the coal 
company's property position remained absolutely the same, he showed 
that variable external factors, like the public interest concerns of the 
city of Scranton and the state attorney general, had to be weighed 
against individual loss in a constitutional -balance. Unfortunately, while 
terms. For example, they will find no "undue" loss in a total inability to develop. 
See Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 11 
Cal. App. 3d 557,89 Cal. Rptr. 897,906 (1970). . 
110. 260 U.S. at 413. 
111. ld. at 414. The basic difference between Holmes and Brandeis in Pennsyl-
vania Coal apparently is not over the law to be applied, but rather over what facts 
to apply to the law. Sedext.accompanying note 98-supra. 
112. 260 U.S. at 414. 
113. Holmes' answer probably turned on contract or estoppel grounds. He made 
much of the fact that the city and pJ,ivate owners should have known the danger and 
reserved the right to support when selling coal rights to the company. ld. at 
415-16. Thus the judicial convention of construing contracts in favor of grantees (who 
typically are at more of a disadvantage) here supports the corporation that best knew 
the possibilities of surface hazard. Compare Buchanan v. Watson, 298 S.W.2d 4() (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1956) with Martin v. KentuckY Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. Ct. 
App.1968). -
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other Holmes opinions reflect the same formulation of the diminution 
test, he never made the balancing feature of his test more precise.114 
Explicit recognition of the balancing process in the diminution test, 
however, will not magically cure diminution's infirmities. A few state 
courts have confronted the logic of the diminution test and, attempted 
to square their decisions with it by recognizing the balancing process, 
but their decisions raise further questions about what and how to 
balance. Illinois zoning decisions have regularly affirmed that or-
dinances will be upheld where the public benefit outweighs the private 
detriment. 115 Other states have echoed the formula in zoning cases,116 
and some have applied it to other police power are as Y 7 Their com-
mendable approach is apparently practicable; neither the court system 
nor the institution of private property has perished in states that apply 
it. But the balancing test in such pristine form requires too many 
major subjective adjustments. If ~ public "benefits" )Veigh against 
private loss, the state will prevail in virtually every caSe, taking prop-
erty rights without compensation wherever it needs them more than 
the owner. If not all beneficial effects should enter the takings equa-
tion, the courts must decide which ones to exclude; having identified 
relevant benefits and costs, the courts must still decide their relative 
weights. Since the balancing-of-interests courts have not yet adequately 
addressed these problems, their handling of the cases remains grossly 
SUbjective. 
114. ct. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Tyson & Brothers v. Banton, 273 U.S. 
418, 445-47 (1927). As Professor Dunham admits, "On the question 'how much is 
too much,' the courtS have never been able to develop . . . a standard more meaningful 
than balancing the public need against the private cost." Dunham, Griggs v.' Alle-
gheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years 0/ Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 
SUP. Cr. REV. 63, 76 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Dunham, Thirty Years]. See Krato-
viI & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 596 (1954). 
115. One lllinois court stated that "the loss in value suffered by the plaintiffs [is 
not] determinative. The proper inquiry is-is this loss necessary because of a corre-
sponding benefit to the general public?" Dixon v. County of Kane, 77 lll. App. 2d 
338, 340, 222 N.E.2d 354, 356 (1966) (emphasis added). See J. METZENBAUM, THE 
LAW OF ZoNING 1430 (2d ed. 1955). The lllinois courts also apply the residuum test. 
Whittingham v. Village of Downers Grove, 101 Ill. App. 2d 166, 242 N.E.2d 460 
(1968). 
116. Rochester Business Inst., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 App. Div. 2d 97, 267 
N.Y.S.2d 274 (1966). 
117. Iowa Natural Resources Council v. Van Zee, 261 Iowa 1287, 158 N.W.2d 111 
(1968); Benschoter v. Hakes, 232 Iowa 1354, 8 N.W.2d 481 (1943); Shirley v. New 
Hampshire Water Pollution Comm'n, 100 N.H. 294, 300, 124 A.2d 189, 194 (1956); 
ct. ME. CONST. art. I, § 21 (1965): "[P]rivate property shall not be taken for public 
uses ••• unless public exigencies require it." ,The provision is arguably limited to 
compensated takings. 
, . 
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III. Alternatives to Diminution 
Constitutional fairness continues to be an enigma under the 
diminution test. Finding an alternative test that serves as a helpful 
guide for courts and adequately represents both private and public in-
terests ranks as one of the most difficult and least promising tasks of 
the law. The array of alternate takings reveals further perceptions 
of constitutional fairness, but does not provide any clearly better al-
ternative. The physical appropriation or "invasion" test, for example, 
can be dismissed out of hand. The courts for some time have recog-
nized that the presence or absence of physical governmental intrusion 
upon property cannot be an adequate indicator of constitutionality.l1S 
The noxious use test, as several observers have noted, offers little more. 
In asking judges to determine whether the restricted property is a nox-
i0us cause of public harm, that test only provides a post hoc ration-
alization for judicial gut reactions.119 
Professor Dunham's takings test draws upon the noxious use 
test's rationale in more sophisticated fashion, and ultimately it suffers 
the same infirmities. Dunham asserted that a regulation causing prop-
erty losses may be sustained if the legislature intended to prevent public 
harm, but not if it sought to obtain public benefit.120 Accordingly, 
one problem the courts must face under this test "is to determine 
whether the prevention of. . . harm is in fact the objective of the leg-
islation."121 If so, the legislation will be sustained; it will be struck 
down "where . . . [its] purpose and effect . . . was to compel one or 
118. But ct. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); Sax, 
supra note 92, at 47-48. The converse proposition is still good: government must 
compensate when it physically enters and holds land, unless it does so to perform an 
official inspection or prevent an imminent catastrophe. 
119. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Sax, supra note 92, at 39, 
48·50. The test works by denying that uses deemed "noxious" are property. Another 
test unworthy of judicial attention is the "incidental injury" test, which states that "an 
individual cannot complain of incidental injury, if the [police] power is exercised for 
proper purposes of public health, safety, morals and general welfare, and if there is 
no arbitrary and unreasonable application in the particular case." Wilkins v. City of 
San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 338, 175 P.2d 542, 547 (1946). Loss is always inci-
dental, since causing private injury is never per se the purpose of a statute. 
120. Several floodplain cases have made this distinction. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Zon-
ing Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971); Morris County Land Improvement 
Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 555-56, 193 A.2d 232, 241-
42 (1963); National Land & !nv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 
504,215 A.2d 597 (1965). 
121. Dunham, Flood Control, supra note 37, at 1124. See also Dunham, Thirty 
Years, supra note 114, at 75-76; Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Plan-
.ning, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650, 666-70 (1958). This principle derives from E. FREUND, 
THE POlleE POWER § 511 (1904). 
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more particular owners to furnish without compensation a benefit wanted 
by the public."122 According to this proposed test, courts have only to 
determine the real legislative purpose to know whether the regulation is 
an impermissible taking.123 This attractive constitutional test draws 
upon traditional concepts of tort law and basic priIiciples of fairness.124 
Unfortunately, its broad either-or criteria do not work, even on Profes-
sor Dunham's own terms. As he noted, the courts have upheld a num-
ber of property restrictions explicitly designed to procure public bene-
fits.125 Moreover, every "harm" does not necessarily justify property 
restrictions. Even if the legislature were convinced that littering, an 
obvious public harm, increased with any form of developed land use, 
its prohibition of development for that reason alone would clearly vio-
late concepts of constitutional proportionality. The dispositive de-
cisional value of a benefit or harm varies widely according to factual 
contexts. 
Even more fundamentally, however, Dunham's test suffers from 
its focus upon legislative purpose. That framework may be com-
pletely misleading, since the real issue is the due process effect upon 
individuals and their property. Arguments about legislative objectives 
do not penetrate to that level of analysis. Further, Dunham's test fails 
t6 define the operative words "harm" and ''benefit.'' While these vague 
words should raise few problems in extreme cases, in more difficult 
situations, one person's "benefit extracted" can be another's "harm 
avoided." In. the flood plain situation, for example, a court could label 
a restriction against private encroachment upon floodplain storage 
areas as the prevention of harm to downstream citizens or the acquisi-
tion of a public benefit in decreased flooding. Likewise, a court could 
view the prohibition of fill in coastal wetlands as either the free public 
122. Dunham, supra note 121, at 669. Dunham hints at a distinction between a 
public objectives test and a private loss test by looking to both purpose and effect. 
See also Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 65, at 1122-28. 
123. Dunham, Flood Control, supra note 37, at 1124. See also Dunham, Property, 
City Planning, and Liberty, in LAw AND LAND 28, 38-43 (C. Haar ed. 1964). 
124. See, e.g., J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND CoNSIDERATIONS ON Rm>-
SENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (R. McCallum ed. 1946) ("IJ1he only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others." ld. at 8.); c/. Michelman, Property, Utility 
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "lust Compensation" Law, 80 
IIARv. L. REv. 1165, 1196-1201 (1967). 
125. Dunham, City Planning, supr4 note 121, at 666-67. See, e.g., Jenad, Inc. v. 
Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966). But 
see Ronda Realty Corp. v. Lawton, 411 lli. 313, 111 N.E.2d 310 (1953) (the court, 
had it chosen to do so, might have upheld the regulation on the reciprocity-of-benefit 
principle). 
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acquisition of nature preserves or the protection of the fish and shellfish 
industries.126 The characterization of each restriction ultimately de-
pends on what the court considers proper cost allocations in the circum-
stances, which ultimately devolves to what it expects property owners to 
absorb and what it expects the public to pay for. As a constitutional 
test, the definitions of "harm" ·and "·benefit" 'are thus conc1usionary self-
fulfilling prophecies that in normal situations prove unhelpful. 
By basing constitutionality on a blanket characterization of the 
legislative objective, Dunham's test, like the noxious use test from 
which it springs, invites the courts to use it as a retrospective rational-
ization rather tlIan as a guide for decisions.127 Our basic perception, 
however, remains important. The public generally does not object to 
governmental property restriction when it can attribute fault to the pri-
vate use. Our conceptions of fairness, however, are offended by gov-
ernment seizure of private rights to obtain results that the property 
owner had no responsibility to provide. 
Professor Sax's first attempt to define a takings test echoed Dun-
ham's distinction and it also focused upon the nature of the govern-
ment action. If a private individual's regulatory loss enhances the gov-
ernment's "resource position in its enterprise capacity, then compensa-
tion is constitutionally required," but when private loss is due to the 
"government acting in its arbitral capacity," no compensation is neces-
sary.128 Although Sax looked to the results rather than the purpose of 
government regulation in applying this test, he was drawing the same 
distinction as Dunham's public objective test. The government acting 
in its enterprise capacity obtains public benefits; the government acting 
in its arbitral capacity prevents property owners from imposing harms 
upon others. 
Like Dunham's analysis, Sax's test assumes that the government 
has a duty to bear some publiq welfare expenses that undeservedly 
benefit it as an enterprise if they are provided by private citizens un-
der the pressure of regulations.129 Since everyone agrees that govern-
ments have a duty to pay for highway rights-of-way, zoning land for 
126. See generally Hitchcock, Can We Save Our Salt Marshes?, 141 NAT'L GEO-
GRAPmc 729 (1972). Ct. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation 
and Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 577,89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); State v. Johnson, 265 
A.2d 711 (Me. 1970). 
127. See Michelman, supra note 124, at 1196-97 n.66. 
128. Sax, supra note 92, at 63. 
129. ld. at 71. Because it focuses on the effect, not merely the purpose, of the 
regulations, however, Sax's test differs significantly from Dunham's. 
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highways only would require compensation. Conversely, nuisance-
type regulations merely arbitrate between' opposing private parties 
and require no compensation. The difficult cases, however, lie be-
tween the extremes, and while Sax identifies a fairness distinction that 
makes human sense, his enterprise..;arbitration analysis again offers only 
a self-fulfilling definition as a test. If a judge thinks that goverilment 
has a duty to assume a cost, he requires compensation for the regula-
tory benefits it has received. Otherwise, he deems the government 
merely an arbitrator who is acting on behalf of segments of the pub-
lic and does not compel compensation. 130 
Professor Michelman's masterful analysis of just compensation 
represents a new approach to the constitutional takings question that 
is no less stimulating for' its failure to provide a satisfactory judicial 
test. Michelman argued a utilitarian theory: that all government meas-
ures should seek to maximize "efficiency gains"-the amount by which 
a measure's benefits exceed its costS.13l He then proceeded to define 
two other costs of a regulation that legislatures and courts normally 
ignore. Initially, he defined "demoralization costs" as the societal cost 
that arises from investors' realiz~tion that their property may be taken 
without compensation. "Settlement costs" refers to the expense in time 
and effort it would take to evaluate and pay demoralization costs. 
If either demoralization or settlement costs are lower then the efficiency 
gain of a regulatory measure, then a utilitarian legislature would adopt 
it. If settlement costs are lower than both demoralization costs and 
efficiency gains, the same legislature would pay compensation. In the 
floodplain situation, for example~ settlement costs would be vast be-
cause of difficulties in locating demoralized persons and ascertaining 
the dollar value of their demoralization. But since floodplain develop-
ment is marginal and since most people might expect development re-
strictions on land near rivers, demoralization costs would be small. 
Under Michelman's test, floodplain restrictions should thus be imple-
mented whenever their efficiency gain is larger than the demoralization 
cost. In practice this test would probably eliminate compensation in 
most floodplain cases. 
130. Sax; today "view[s] the 'pro~lem ~ 'co~siderably more complex." Sax, supra 
note 38, at 150 n.5. He has abandoned the distinction postulated in this first takings 
test in favor of quite another approach. See text accompanying notes 133-36 infra. 
131. Michelman, supra note 121, at. 1214-18. Michelman used a straightforward 
definition of costs and benefits: He stated that "benefits are measured by the total 
number of dollars which prospective gainers wquld be willing to pay to secure adoption, 
and losses are measured by the'total number of dollars which prospective losers would 
insist on as the price of agreeing to adoption." [d. at 1214. 
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Michelman's theory is not, except by extension, a judicial tak-
ings test; it serves only as a guide to legislative and administrative policy 
on regulatory compensation. Yet, it is directly relevant to judicial 
takings tests. Michelman asserted that utility is fairness because so-
ciety's expectations about the security of property rights will be realized 
under a utilitarian compensation rule that takes demoralization costs 
into account. He pointed out that judges already follow this kind of 
utilitarian rationale by preventing shocking regulatory results that 
would offend the property-owning public. Michelman's own formula 
is too abstract to serve as a working test, and he has conceded that 
some legislative "artificial settlement" rule may be more practical. His 
utility concept of fairness, furthermore, can often strike inequitably 
on the individual level; it thrusts burdens upon the poor minority chump 
whose situation is so different from others that his disgruntlement does 
not create appreciable demoralization costs for society at large.ls2 
Even if Michelman's weighing of frustrated expectations can some-
times shortchange ·the balance, his analysis of judicial takings prob-
lems points out the crucial function of social expectations in forming 
most fairness judgments. 
Professor Sax's latest takings test adopts a more appealing stand-
ard of constitutional fairness than draconian utility, but produces a 
policy-dominated test that fails to discriminate between different de-
grees of private interest. His most recent takings article focuses upon 
the "inextricability" of competing uses within resource networks. 
Virtually all uses impinge upon other property owners' utilization of 
the common environment. A person's claim to clean air for breath-
ing, for example, competes with a power plant's desire to use it for 
stack gas disposal. lss Virtually all actual and potential uses "spill 
over" beyond their own property Iines1S4 making intermingled claims 
upon common resource networks. Accordingly, Sax asserted that a 
property owner cannot make a constitutional complaint about any leg-
islative allocation that chooses some spillover uses over others, unless 
the choice is made for arbitrary or constitutionally proscribed reas-
132. Michelman does suggest adjustments to improve the lot of minorities, either 
through judicial subjectivity or legislative "artificial settlement" prOvisions. ld. at 
1248-49, 1255-56. 
133. Sax, supra note 38, at 154. 
134. The definition of spillovers can be very broad, including noise and smoke 
crossing property lines, impositions on common resources, use of property to injure oth-
ers or to cause burdens on government services, and claims for a zone of quiet around 
airports. ld. at 161-67. 
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ons. Sax's constitutional theory clearly draws upon nuisance law. In 
nuisance cases courts traditionally have chosen "between spillover uses, 
and losers have no constitutional complaints even if their loss is dis-
proportionate to the winners' gain.135 The courts, however, are able 
to review the individual circumstances of competing uses and follow a 
rough proportionality that can adjust the allocation of uses to expecta-
tions in each case. In Sax's analysis, on the other hand, the legisla-
ture is the only forum that reviews private interests. Yet the legis-
lature need not totally ignore the individual. In making resource deci-
sions it should carefully balance all public and private costs to maximize 
overall benefits. The legislature can thus consider individual losses as 
well as Michelman's demoralization costs. Still, the legislative process 
does not assure consideration of specific cases; major individual misal-
locations may go unobserved in the entire regulatory process.136 
Sax's test further avoids the distinction made in his first takings 
analysis between regulating to prevent harm to others and regulating 
to obtain certain gains for governmental enterprise. His newer test 
does not consider the nature of property development's effects upon 
the public. Instead, as soon as a use spills over onto others, no mat-
ter how minor the effect, it loses its right to individual constitutional 
consideration. While this result has antecedents in -the common law, 
it _ does not harmonize with present society's fairness expectations as 
expressed in the takings decisions. If property owners really expected 
that virtually any effect upon others may justify the abatement of their 
property uses, property ownership would be a high stakes gamble in-
deed. The expectations basic to the fifth and fourteenth amendments' 
guarantees are probably more discriminating. People anticipate that 
courts will implement some kind of proportionality between private 
loss and impacts upon the affected public, and for -the foreseeable 
future that expectation will continue to be an important element in 
American notions of fairness. 
Insofar as Sax does not distinguish constitutionally between dif-
135. Ct. Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913) (pa-
per mill shut down due to injuries sustained by a do~tream farmer in the amount 
of $100). Appeals of such tort decisions are argued on tort law grounds, not constitu-
tional takings grounds. 
136. The policy-makers' balance governs, not the court's view of individual situa-
tions, except to identify the e]cistence (not the degree) of spillovers or the arbitrariness 
of the choice of plaintiff as the object of regulatiori. Sax, supra note 38, at 176. The 
political process rather than the judicial process will be the major restraint on govern-
ment over-regulation in an "excess of zeal." Sax believes that in most legislative deci-
sionmaking, property owners can defend themselves adequately. [d. at 171. 
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ferent degrees of private loss or private effect, he repeats the flaws of 
the old reciprocity test under which restricted persons who gained any 
benefits from a restriction had no constitutional complaint. The courts 
were never much impressed with the fairness potential of that test.137 
Nevertheless, the core of his theory-that no resource user is an island 
separate from those around him-must be a central perception in 
any modem test of government regulation. By exercising uncontrolled 
use of their land, property owners impose burdens on others, and any 
constitutional test that ignores these spillovers closes its eyes to the reality 
of the regulatory situation. 
IV. Diminution Revisited 
A. Balancing 
From the strengths and weaknesses of the competing takings tests 
emerge a number of perceptions that should be part of any reformula-
tion of takings principles. As a policy matter, legislatures allocating 
resource uses should attempt to maximize total social good by fully 
considering total public and private costs and benefits prior to deciding 
upon property use regulations. Yet if, as a constitutional matter, the 
courts are to review the effect of police power regulations upon particu-
lar individuals,138 they cannot ignore the various competing claims in 
each regulatory case. Comprehensiveness of review is necessary to re-
flect the real multilateral nature of regulation and to assure that neither 
private property losses nor public policy pressures will monopolize 
judicial review. Diminution thus continues to be important, but in 
light of an explicitly recognized need to balance public considerations, 
it can no longer remain the preeminent inquiry. 
In reviewing both sides of regulatory conflicts, courts must be 
more discriminating than they have been in the past. Any balancing 
test must more subtly quantify public and private interests. An ap-
propriate constitutional balancing cannot simply compare the total ef-
137. The reciprocity principle-that regulation is justified so long as the regulatee 
shares to some degree in the benefits of restriction-appeared even in Pennsylvania 
Coal. 260 U.S. at 415, 442. Yet that principle's disregard of proportionality and fail-
ure to distinguish between classes of benefits and harms apparently limited its appeal 
on its own merits, and few modem courts use the test. ct. Heyman & Gilbool, supra 
note 65, at 1128-29. 
138. Fifty years of the dominance of diminution argue that court review of regula-
tory effects on individuals cannot and should not be eliminated. Indeed, the utilitarian 
analysis of proportionality in society's expectations about regulation supports future ad-
herence to the principle. See Michelman, supra note 124, at 1183-1201, 1224-45. 
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fects on either side. The recurrence of harm-benefit tests over the 
years and the failure of existing balancing tests to win more adher-
ents139 both testify to the need for a constitutional distinction between 
the blameworthy effects for which an individual may be held ac-
countable and the public enterprise benefits that property owners do 
not have to provide free for the rest of society.140 The distinction is 
often difficult to draw and is easy to misuse. But it is unavoidable 
in any takings test that attempts to be consistent with the constitutional 
fairness principles enunciated by courts and commentators over the 
years. Finally, the fairness expectations embodied in most takings tests 
illustrate that a discriminating balancing process requires some propor-
tionality between the degrees of public need and private loss. While 
minor threats to the public cannot justify devastating private losses, 
large personal losses may be supportable when great public interests 
are imperiled.141 
The essential proposition that distills from the confusion of the 
takings tests is that courts must explicitly recognize both the costs that 
private uses impose upon the public and the individual losses that gov-
ernment action causes. This approach forces courts to consider com-
plex physical and ecological resource relationships and to distinguish 
between the different effects of property use.142 Using this process, the 
courts are in a far better position to undertake the balancing task that 
remains at the heart of judicial review. Reconstituted in this way, the 
balancing approach does two things: it offers one firm minimum 
constitutional conclusion and produces a two-stage takings inquiry that 
provides a more rational and workable rule. 
The first stage of this "diminution-balancing" approach consists 
of implementing the assertion that regulations are always constitution-
ally valid when the costs that an unrestricted property use imposes upon 
the public would be greater than private diminution losses. No pri-
vate loss, in other words, can be constitutionally excessive if it is less 
than the costs it would impose on others. When private losses exceed im-
139. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 52, at § 2.19 (1968). 
140. The distinction recurs in other guises. For example, affirmative resource plan-
ning schemes designed to foster clean air have been called "more suspect" than nega-
tive plans emphasizing protection against harm. Pollack, Legal Boundaries of Air Pol-
lution Control-State and Local Legislative Purpose and Techniques, 33 LAw & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 331,339-42 (1968). 
141. Excessiveness should be judged only on net private losses over and above po-
tential public costs. 
142. The courts in County of Del Norte and Turnpike Realty narrowly missed this 
vital point. See text accompanying notes 103-09 supra. 
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posed costs, the analysis continues to a second stage, at which other 
constitutional principles operate further to define constitutional exces-
siveness. 
B. The First Stage 
The first stage of the diminution-balancing inquiry requires judges 
to determine whether private property losses caused by government 
regulations exceed the public costs resulting from unrestricted uses. 
Private property rights have traditionally been limited according to their 
effect upon other private property rights and public rights. us Legis-
latures, in restricting, allocating, and prohibiting specific uses, act on 
behalf of affected members of the public in the same manner as courts 
deciding between competing private property uses. The primary dif-
ference is that legislatures make general rather than specific use al-
locations, and thus they can choose among uses that never could com-
front each other in court. . Both kinds of intervention force property 
owners to internalize actual or potential damages caused by the use to 
whlch they put their land. Surely a private property owner has no 
greater constitutional property right against those who are protected 
by government regulations than he has against private litigants in com-
mon law actions. Just the opposite should be the case. Given the 
heavy presumption in favor of legislative enactments, regulations 
should be able to restrict cost-imposing uses far beyond the point of con-
temporary private tort actions.144 
Since public rights traditionally have limited private rights, the 
recent expansion of public rights does not create a new jurisprudential 
basis for regulating property rights; it merely expands the situations for 
application .of principles that adjust conflicting interests. Given this 
backdrop, the principle that private property rights may not prevail 
over public rights when the injury to the latter would be greater than 
the private harm sustained from regulation is certainly no radical prop-
osition. To say otherwise is to assert that a property owner has a con-
stitutional right to injure other interests confronting his in order to ob-
tain or conserve a smaller gain for himself. 
143. Public and private nuisance are the most obvious examples. See P. ScHROTH 
& Z. PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: AN lNTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 4.01 (Univ. of Mich., School of Natural Resources, 4th internal ed. 1973). 
144. Nothing here argues that regulatory law should swallow up tort law, although 
that may be a danger in careless interpretations of Professor Sax's most recent article. 
Sax, supra note 38. 
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1. Defining and Quantifying CO$ts.~uantification of pri-
vate loss is a familiar judicial function in zoning cases, and it typically 
will be the easiest part of the constitutional review process. The courts 
can obtain the relevant base figure for regulatory losses by comparing 
readily available market valuations for a piece of property with and 
without regulation. ,Some contemporary ju~cial approaches to pri-
vate property valuation, however, deserve cautionary notes. The cqurts 
should base loss figures on differentials in the market price of land, 
not on total development cost or anticipated profit. Since developers 
can relocate, banning the use at one location presumably would not 
completely eliminate the value of the plans. If they cannot develop 
elsewhere, the market will reflect that fact in premiums incorporated 
in the land valuation.145 Further, in valuing restrictions upon develop-
ment rights, courts must consider only those rights that property own-
ers hold as against the state. The recent Maryland case of Potomac 
Sand & Gravel v. Mande[146 demonstrates how this consideration may 
circumscribe the private loss figure. Plaintiff attacked the state's wet-
lands act, which prohibited him from dredging his property. Since 
the Maryland public trust doctrine reserved to the state a protective 
right over coastal wetlands,the court upheld the wetlands act on the 
ground that a person could not claim private loss for development re-
strictions subject to that trust. Thus, since the plaintiff had no right 
to dredge his property, the prohibition deprived him of no rights. 
The courts can and logically should view measures of private loss 
as the difference between ,the regulated and unregulated market value of 
the property rights that owners actually hold.147 In some special cir-
145. Similarly, according to theories of market pricing, the higher cost of alternate 
sites will be reflected in base land prices. Some hard cases will involve parcels where 
an owner had made plans and preparations for development that is forbidden, and 
had not taken sufficient actions to establish a nonconforming use. See generally Waite, 
Ransoming the Maine Environment, 23 MAINE L. REv. 103, 116-18 & nn.64-66 (1971) 
(arguing that there need be no ,compensation paid for frustrated plans or speculative 
values). 
, 146. 2:66 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241 (1972). 
147. The public trust principle should be extended to rivers. See Sax, The Public 
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial'Intervention, 68' MICH. 
L. REv. 471 (1970). Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 266 Md. 
358, 293 A.2d 241 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1973), involved a disingenu-
ous use of the diminution test. Plaintiff's lands :were 70 percent public trust wetlands 
and 30 percent non-trust lands. The court held that since plaintiff had nothing to 
lose to the state in 70 percent of its holdings, its loss was only 30 percent, which 
loss was "not of such a magnitude as to justify a finding that [the act] was • • • in-
valid." Id. at 375, 293 ~2d at 250. The ,court should have simply held that the 
amount of loss was justified by public harms inflicted by dredging valuable fish and 
wildlife holding grounds. 
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cumstances, however, loss figures may deserve expansion beyond that 
amount.14S For example, when a court figures market value on a prior 
zone classification that was legislated in order to drive down acquisi-
tion costs or takings comparisons, a court might look to the value of 
the land before the prior classification. 
The question of public costs imposed by unrestricted uses, which 
courts in traditional takings cases conveniently have ignored, also con-
fronts a court in the first stage of the diminution-balancing analysis. 
The classification distinction between imposed "costs," and other in-
nocent effects should not replay the obsolete "noxious use" tests and 
the awkward distinction between harms and benefits. Unless cost 
classes are defined with some degree of specificity, the diminution-
balancing approach remains a subjective ramble by judges who are 
free to uphold or void regulations depending upon their identification 
of costs. The noxious use test was justifiably rejected for its crude 
characterizations of regulated uses, and its latter-day manifestations 
suffer the same defect. The diminution-balancing approach attempts 
to avoid these problems by restricting the function of harm identi-
fication. Ascertaining the existence. of public costs is only one im-
portant component of the process instead of the dispositive takings 
criterion. The courts must further analyze the nature and degree of 
harm with great specificity in order to handle the further question of 
balancing. Judicial distinctions between privately externalized costs 
and other unattributable side effects inevitably remain subjective, and 
they run the risk of becoming tautologies like Dunham's harms and 
benefits. Yet guidelines are available to improve upon past attempts 
at the distinction.149 
Another example of a court trying manfully to adjust the diminution basis to fit 
the natural context is Spiegle v. Borough of Beach Haven, 46 N.J. 479, 218 A.2d 129 
(1966). The court assumed that property value was not lost where the "regulation 
[which prohibited development at the coastal dune line] proscribed only such conduct 
as good husbandry would dictate that plaintiffs shOUld themselves impose on the use 
of their own lands." ld. at 492, 218 A.2d at 137. This ignores actual market value 
in order to achieve the rational end of recognizing storm hazards. Other base valua-
tion questions include whether speculative value and the value of private extraordi-
nary services should be discounted. See I. LEVEY, supra note 81, at'336-38, 344-4u. 
148. See City of Miami v. Silver, 257 So. 2d 563· (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Mc-
Hugh v. City of Dearborn, 348 Mich. 311, 83 N.W.2d 222 (1957); Winepol v. Town 
of Hempstead, 59 Misc. 2d 768, 300 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. 1969). 
149. The Supreme Court in its first exposure to zoning offered one guideline: "In 
solving doubts [about the validity of regulation] the maxim 'sic utere tuo ut alienum 
non laedas,' which lies at the foundation of so much of the common law of nuisances, 
ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful clew." Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (for non-classicists, ~'use your own .property so as not to 
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Courts in nuisance actions regularly decide which spillover prop-
erty effects can figure into judicial allocations between competing prop-
erty rights~ and they do so by reflecting society's changing conceptions 
of property owners' rights and duties. Most courts have reversed 
their initial determination in smoke nuisance cases that air pollution 
was a reasonable adjunct of industrial progress. Aesthetic concerns 
may now be undergoing the same change. The judicial process of 
identifying some effects as common law harms can be similarly useful in 
identifying costs for takings question purposes.1SO In addition, the nui-
sance analogy illustrates that the characterization of some private ef-
fects may depend upon the nature of the public interest invaded. Some 
offensive property uses are not actionable in private nuisance because 
no private property rights are directly affected; yet they can be litigated 
in public nuisance if courts choose to recognize a public right beyond 
property rights.1li1 Public trust theories can work in the sam~ way by 
identifying various interests as trust interests of the state and opening 
otherwise nonactionable impositions upon those interests to judicial 
.abatement. 152 
Judicial use of the nuisance analogy by no means restricts cost 
identifications to those property effects traditionally recognized as 
common law nuisances. 153 Property uses have broad effects beyond 
their own boundaries and far along the resource stream. While com-
mon law inquiry into causation stops fairly close to home, legislative 
and administrative resource allocation decisions are typically much wider, 
weighing costs throughout a resource network's stream of causation. 
Judicial review of these decisions should reflect the same inquiry.1lB 
injure that of others"). Although precise quantification of total damages is probably 
beyond present technological capability, evidence of prior flood costs in comparable wa-
tersheds can afford a potent counterweight to private market losses. 
150. For examples of judicial response to societal changes in resolving the takings 
question see State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 147 A. 294 (1930); Wulfsohn v. Burden, 
241 N.Y. 288, 299,150 N.E. 120, 122 (1925). 
151. Ct. Attorney General ex reI. Township of Wyoming v. City of Grand Rapids, 
175 Mich. 503, 141 N.W. 890 (1913). 
152. E.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (court 
recognized a public right in the natural environment, asserting that private ownership 
of property does not include the right to destroy property for future generations). ct. 
Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); Arnold v. 
MUndy, 6 N.J.L. 1,71-78 (Sup. Ct. 1821). 
153. Ct. J. KUSLER, supra note 50, at 152; FLOOD lIAzAR:O AREAS, supra note 50, 
at 389 (1971). Traditional nuisance definitions do not go far enough in scope or rem-
edy to be an adequate touchstone of real public costs. 
154. Sax feels that "[i]f we wish to cbpe intelligently with the use of resources, 
we must focus attention on the nature and degree to which the consequences of ,any 
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Courts would give redress for many cost impositions upon a common 
resource network if the whole receiving network belonged to a single 
landowner. That a floodplain development burdens numerous down-
stream users is no reason to discount its full effect. Courts should re-
gard regulations as legislative declarations that interests equivalent to 
those of adjacent landowners inhere to the public.155 To ignore the 
extended effects of each use is to ignore the factual reality upon which 
regulatory policy is based. In practice, of course, the courts have 
looked beyond direct causation in reviewing regulations.156 Contem-
porary developments in public nuisance doctrines and the public trust 
jus publicum further extend the inquiry as they broaden the scope of 
rights that state action can defend. 
The arguments against recognition of the distant effects of prop-
erty uses in common law litigation do not prevent the extended con-
sideration of costs in the regulatory setting.157 Since legislatures 
take actions to protect the public at large throughout a chain of cau-
sation, costs should be judicially cognizable anywhere within the legisla-
tively protected sphere. No measurement of specific threats to spe-
cific individuals should be necessary. 
Once courts identify the public costs of unrestricted uses, they 
face the challenging task of quantifying them. Since many losses are 
prospective hazards of varying intensities, which threaten differing per-
sonal and property damage, courts face an even more difficult task. 
In the floodplain cases, public cost quantification requires estimates of 
use are disseminated across property, state, and even national boundaries." Sax, supra 
note 38, at 155. A strip mine, for instance, has land and water quality effects upon 
fishing, residential, and recreational users downslope, downstream, and several hundred 
miles away that normally could never be litigated under common law theories. A wet-
lands fill increases the cumulative depletion of natural shoreline prote.ction and spawn-
ing areas, affecting shoreline residents, commercial and sport fishermen, nature lovers, 
and urban citizens who must pay more for their seafood dinners, not to mention the 
absolute loss of natural values. 
155. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "the fact that particular en-
vironmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them 
less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process." Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). 
156. Some of the most famous Supreme Court takings decisions, for example, have 
inquired into the indirect consequences of restricted uses, despite the fa.ct that such 
effects were not sufficiently proximate to ground common law abatement actions. See, 
e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926). 
157. For example, even if the fear of causing a multiplicity of suits was a good 
reason to deny otherwise actionable claims, this should be irrelevant in the case of 
regulations. The conjecture and difficulty of proving that specific injuries to specific 
victims were caused by other speCific land users are similarly subsumed in the broad 
coverage of a regulation. 
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local threats to the lives, health, and property of land owners, and 
it further necessitates measurements of pot~ntial losses throughout the 
entire watershed that must be attributed pro rata to each owner. These 
are precisely the difficulties that stalemate current common law rem-
edies and other techniques for internalizing flood costs. Quantifica-
tion of public costs in terms of dollars is simply impossible in many 
regulatory cases, and the complexity of the analysis and the require-
ment of individual assessments negate the utility of that approach. 
Courts should not ignore network-wide costs simply because pre-
cision is impossible. They should establish dollar quantities for public 
costs, but if this proves impossible they must conceptualize and approx-
fmate those costs in terms that allow judgments based on propor-
tionality and excessiveness.158 This necessarily entails judicial notice 
of the nature and degree of possible losses to all potentially affected 
interests throughout the resource network as well as the cumulative 
nature of the imposed harm.1 5.9 
2. Balancing: The Burden Shi/ts.-As in other areas involving 
difficult factual issues, judges can turn from substance to procedure 
for the answer to their dilemma. Since they customarily presume that 
legislative enactments are valid, the burden of pleading and proof of 
public costs and private losses must fall on the party attacking the 
regulations. Under the traditional diminution test, the plaintiffs need 
only prove individual loss in some form or other. Once a plaintiff 
pleaded and proved a large percentage loss or a minimal residual use 
the burden shifted to the government to disprove the loss figures, to 
avoid the issue on other grounds, or to raise countervailing constitu-
tional arguments. The diminution-balancing test would immediately 
require plaintiffs to prove not only their own losses, but also ·that these 
are not outweighed by the public costs potentially attributable to the 
prohibited uses, because both elements would be necessary to make out 
a prima facie case of regulatory unreasonableness.loo That result is in-
158. See Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 
(1972); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, - Mass. -,284 N.E.2d 891, 899-
900 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973). The nature of costs to life, property, 
ecological balances, environmental values, and aesthetics will vary the terms of the ju-
dicial inquiry according to somewhat subjective differentials in evaluation. 
159. The fact that each separate imposition adds only insignificantly to the total 
cost should not be reason to avoid attributing some of the cumulative effect to each. 
One backyard bonfire may injure no one in and of itself, yet many nuisance injunctions 
and local ordinances prohibit any smoke source because of the cumulative air polluting 
effect that many would produce. See E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING 1-29 (1971). 
160. A prima facie case requires proof of the basic elements of regulatorY invalid-
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escapable if the strong presumption of validity for police power regula-
tions protecting the public is not abandoned.161 
C. The Second Stage Inquiry 
The minimum proposition incorporated in the first stage of diminu-
tion-balancing review will dispose of regulatory takings questions in-
volving grave hazards and large public losses. The first stage inquiry 
is only a minimum review, and the converse proposition that any regu-
lation imposing more costs than it prevents is ipso facto invalid does not 
hold. The takings cases over the years demonstrate that excessiveness 
of individual loss is not measured solely in terms of countervailing pub-
lic harms. In the Supreme Court's first exposure to zoning, it enun-
ciated the principle that safe and inoffensive uses may have to yield 
so that dangerous and offensive uses can be eliminated. The Court 
felt that "[t]he inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effective 
enforcement will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of in-
validity."162 Thus even considerations of governmental efficiency 
may justify net private losses. Other situations in which net losses 
may be constitutionally valid include restrictions on the food and 
drug industries,163 under criminal laws,164 and when property owners 
ity. Especially in light of the presumption of validity, plaintiffs in floodplain cases 
would have to prove at least that the elements of minimum basic validity are not satis-
fied. Government counsel, of course, will have the tactical role of showing that plain-
tiff's proof of net loss is not based upon sufficiently broad or detailed public cost in-
quiries. Ct. J. WIGMORE, A STuDENT'S TEXTBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 439 
(1935). 
161. The Supreme Court's actions in recent zoning ~ases show that the presumption 
of validity for land use legislation is, at least at the summit of our federal court system, 
nearly irrebuttable. Certiorari was denied in Turnpike Realty (409 U.S. 1108 (1973)) 
and appeal was dismissed in Consolidated Rock ·Products (371 U.S. 36 (1962)). In 
both cases the plaintiffs' takings claims seemed to deserve at least a look. At the state 
level the presumption of validity is getting stronger even in zoning cases, as demon-
strated by departure from strict interpretation of zoning ordinances in favor of more 
liberal construction. E.g., Exton Quarries Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 425 
Pa. 443, 449-50,228 A.2d 169, 173-74 (1967). 
162. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926). In 
that situation, the court apparently felt that there remained a satisfactory residuum. 
163. The food industry apparently has a special quasi-public nature. No takings 
claims arose out of the sudden F.D.A. ban on cyclamates, for instance, although the 
industry claimed that there was absolutely no proof that cyclamates caused injury to 
humans. Ct. Fallows, Picking up the TAB, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Nov. 1972, 
at 20, 22. Such special vulnerability for quasi-public industries is mentioned in Tyson 
& Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927). 
164. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). No takings complaints are heard 
from marijuana stockpilers whose hoards are seized, even though it may not be as haz-
ardous to health as alcohol. 
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have notice of impending government controp65 
By far the greatest body of precedent for uncompensated net 
losses lies in the zoning cases. The diminution theory they evolved 
allows the possibility that courts will uphold regulations regardless of 
whether public costs are greater than individual burdens. Applica-
tion of like principles to the second stage inquiry therefore should be 
relatively uncontroversial. If a landowner sustains losses in excess of 
public costs and retains a sufficient residuum, he may still fail in his 
attack on governmental regulations. For example, if a plaintiff has 
holdings contiguous to the parcel upon which there is an excess 
of private loss over public cost, a court in the second stage inquiry may 
discount the measure of his loss by the profitability of the adjacent 
property and sustain the regulation so long as there is an overall prof-
itable residuum. 166 The principles applicable in the second stage in-
quiry continue to incorporate subjective elements, but the first stage 
inquiry should eliminate the major element of current unbridled sub-
jectivity by taking explicit account of public interest factors. Sup-
porters of the old diminution formula might assert that the traditional 
diminution principles incorporated a balance of public costs in their 
workings, and thus their application to net losses puts the property 
pwner in double jeopardy. This is hardly realistic. If a court upholds 
a regulation in the second stage inquiry because of a residual prof-
itable use, the plaintiff theoretically would have had the same residual 
use under the old less explicit tests. If his net loss is not excessive when 
measured with his adjacent unregulated holdings, then the court has 
only forced him to face the real externalized costs that judicial seman-
tics had previously allowed him to ignore.161 
D. Conclusion 
The reworked diminution-balancing test does not pretend to elim-
inate subjectivity from constitutional review of environmental regula-
165. See United States v. 531 Acres of Land, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966), eer!. 
denied, 385 U.S. 1025 (1967). ct. Sax, supra note 38, at 180-81. In tort law the 
discovery of new methods of detection that reveal long-standing unsuspected imposition 
upon others leads to liability with no taking complaints. See Renken v. Harvey Alum-
inum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963). 
166. If the .comprehensive balancing of the whole locus is relevant to the validity 
of regulations preserving wetlands, it should be all the more applicable to floodplains 
where direct hazards to humans are involved. See Commissioner of Natural Resources 
V. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 111-12, 206 N.E.2d 666,671-72 (1965). 
167. The property owner could conceivably have been forced to bear such costs un-
der tort law, compensation for government services, or compulsory insurance schemes. 
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tions. Subjective judgments will continue to appear in the balancing 
process at both stages of constitutional inquiry implicit in the test. 
But judgmental flexibility must inevitably remain in any test that is 
not based upon absolutes, and constitutional reasonableness and fair-
ness cannot be defined in absolutes. The diminution-balancing ap:-
proach, however, can usefully inform and guide judicial discretion. 
In order to rule explicitly on whether private harms outweigh public 
costs in the first stage, the courts must base their constitutional examina-
tion upon a network-wide analysis of costs and benefits. Since undue 
subjectivity at this stage will be embarrassingly apparent, courts should 
be hesitant to decide first and to provide rationalizations later. Having 
balanced public and private interests in the first stage, the courts can 
feel less hesitant in reviewing private loss according to the orthodox 
residuum diminution method of the second stage. The net result should 
be a realistic test that recognizes public losses but incorporates tradi-
tional notions of fairness to private individuals. 
V. Epilogue-Floodplains and Diminution-Balancing 
The constitutional clarifications suggested here offer strong sup-
port for floodplain regulations and analogous police power restrictions; 
in most situations floodplain measures will fit the fundamental require-
ments for regulatory validity. Successful regulations, of course, require 
solid technical foundations. Base data must have support in competent 
hydrological studies, accurately represented on floodplain maps. The 
legislature must choose a form of legislation that fits both floodplain 
management requirements and the administrative capabilities of the 
governing unit. Especially at the state level this task may require ex-
tensive adjustment and coordination of procedures between different 
agencies in the regulatory process. Schedules of uses automatically 
permitted or prohibited can minimize administrative work, but they 
must be flexible enough to fit the varying characteristics of regulated 
locations. In general, a list of automatically permitted uses should 
include as many low intensity uses as possible, and automatically pro-
hibited uses should be those possessing the highest potential for on-
site or off-site flood damages. 
The permit procedures for all other uses not specifically per-
mitted or proscribed, however, are far more basic to the effectiveness 
The diminution principles cannot apply solely to losses below the public cost level, 
since tho~ principles do not attempt to incorporate public costs. 
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of floodplain regulations. If the permit process successfully identifies 
and weighs all cost externalizing factors in development proposals, it 
can tailor the grant of permits to fit the full requfrements of a national 
floodplain management policy. For example, a local board could re-
view site plans, local floodflow characteristics, displacement and ob-
struction effects, and damage potentials on- and off-site, according to a 
detailed list of permit criteria. With this guide it could adjust the de-
sign and use intensity of proposed development to maximize net 
benefits to public interests while minimizing costS.168 In some situa-
tions, of course, it might find that a regulation permitted no feasible 
market use; in others a board might encourage innovative attempts to 
adapt human uses to the river environment. In all cases the permit 
process would prevent discounting the latent costs of floodplain de'" 
velopment. 
An adequately designed permit procedure will sharply reduce the 
number of variance proceedings that currently undercut many zone 
ordinances. Traditionally, legislatures designed variances to prevent 
courts from voiding otherwise reasonable regulations in situations im-
posing constitutionally excessive hardships on individuals. While in 
theory the criteria for granting variances were often strict, in practice 
they became exercises for instant amendment of zone ordinances where 
political, economic and other pressures came to bear on the regulating 
authority.169 If a floodplain regulatory board has carefully evaluated 
the potential costs arising from proposed development before denying 
an application, it will have undertaken the same constitutional bal-
ancing process that would be incorporated in any subsequent consti-
tutional challenge to regulatory validity, including requests for vari-
ances. Only in extraordinary cases should variance proceedings pro-
duce a different result from permit application proceedings. Recog-
nizing the constitutional character of the variance request, counsel and 
judges administering regulations should be in a better position to pre-
vent dilution of the floodplain management policy. 
Nonconforming use provisions are standard in most existing flood-
plain regulations, undoubtedly due to the direct influence of zoning. 
168. The Vartelas appellate court apparently tried to encourage attempts at innova-
tive modifications like stilting. Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n, 146 Conn. 650, 
657-58, 153 A.2d 822, 825 (1959). On the subject of sound evidence and careful 
drafting, see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, supra note 83, at 284-301. 
169. Ct. Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 313-14, 197 A.2d 
770,774 (1964) (court argues against profligate grants 6f variances). 
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law and perhaps to a political judgment that future development is a 
more important target for initial attempts at regulation than existing de-
velopment. Zoning law amortization principles, however, should cer-
tainly apply to the floodplain situation in light of the real dangers 
posed by existing structures in floodplirins. Moreover, if hydrological 
evidence proves that some existing encroachments directly threaten 
property, the legislature could declare those uses public nuisances sub-
ject to abatement under terms of enacted regulations. Finally, when 
property owners challenge regulations as invalid takings, the most re-
cent floodplain cases lend hope that the courts will apply the diminu-
tion-balancing standard, which will support the validity of most flood-
plain regulations. Turnpike Realty and County of Del Norte demon-
strate that in this time of heightened, awareness of flood disasters, 
judges are ready and able to consider the potential harms attributable 
to floodplain development; it remains for counsel to demonstrate the 
c::onstitutional role of that evidence. By identifying the range of po-
tential harms as costs imposed upon the public, judges can weigh alle-
gations of private loss in more rational perspective. 
The public dangers attributable to floodplain development are as 
easy to conceptualize as they are hard to specify in dollar terms. Dol-
lar quantifications of the public interest, however, are extremely 
rare in the case law, even if a court makes a pUblic-private balancing, 
indicating that courts evaluate public interest in more subjective 
terms. A well-prepared defense of a floodplain regulation against a 
plaintiff's allegations of disproportionate private loss thus must present 
hydrologic and economic rebuttal evidence of potential private and 
public costs on and off the development site. If counsel can estab-
lish the likelihood of those potential effects, he has laid the basis for 
a constitutional balance. 
A variety of elements in the floodplain situation indicate that the 
balance will typically favor the validity of floodplain regulations. One 
is the nature of the opposing interests. While private regulatory loss 
is almost exclusively financial, floodplain regulations protect human 
lives, health, and property. Public harms are likely to predominate 
in amount as well, especially since the portions of the plaintiff's own 
investment that may suffer flood damage are a legitimate part of the 
public concern. Given the strong presumption of regulatory validity 
and the concomitant burden upon parties attacking regulations, courts 
will ordinarily have no difficulty upholding regulations of demonstrable 
flood hazards. When the challenge is not settled by an initial com-
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parison of costs, courts will have to proceed to the second stage of 
takings review and analyze whether net losses are unconstitutionally 
excessive. If a profitable land use remains to the owner, courts should 
have no trouble upholding regulations. Likewise, judicial weighing of 
net loss in the light of all the plaintiffs contiguous holdings will often 
be an available support for floodplain restrictions. 
Once the courts lbok beyond individual loss, the confluence of 
public welfare, environmental values, and concern for future genera-
tions strongly favor the survival of floodplain regulations, and the con-
stitutional test there applied offers improvement in judicial review of 
environmental regulations generally. 
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